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Abstract
Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention
to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences
for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this informa-
tion. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send
a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that
introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of
matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds
the most value for balanced markets.
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1 Introduction
Job seekers in labor markets often apply for many positions, as there is a low cost for
applying and a high value for being employed. Consequently, many employers face the
near impossible task of reviewing and evaluating hundreds of applications. Moreover, since
pursuing candidates is often costly, employers may need to assess not only the quality of
an applicant, but also whether the applicant is attainable: that is, whether the candidate
is likely to ultimately accept a job offer, should the employer make one. In this paper we
study a mechanism that aids employers in this evaluation process by allowing applicants to
credibly signal information about their preferences for positions.
In practice, in many markets that suffer from this form of application congestion, can-
didates communicate special interest for a select number of places. For example, in college
admissions in the United States, many universities have early admission programs, where
high school seniors may apply to exactly one college before the general application period.
Evidence suggests that universities respond to such action in that it is easier to get into a
college through early admission programs (Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser, 2003).1 An-
other example of applicants signaling interest can be found in the market for entry-level
clinical psychologists, which in the early 1990’s was organized as a telephone-based market.
On “match day,” program directors called applicants to make offers, and candidates were,
at any moment, allowed to hold on to at most one offer. At the end of match day, all
non-accepted offers were automatically declared as rejected. Due in part to its limited time
frame, this market suffered from congestion, and it was common for program directors to
make offers out of their preference order to applicants who credibly indicated they would
accept an offer immediately (Roth and Xing, 1997).2
Some markets have formal, market-wide mechanisms that allow participants to signal
preferences, and the formal nature of the signals ensures credibility. Since 2006, The Ameri-
can Economic Association (AEA) has operated a signaling service to facilitate the job search
1Under single early application programs, universities often require that an applicant not apply early to
other schools, and this is often enforced by high school guidance counselors. In another example of colleges
looking for signs of interest, many schools take great care to note whether applicants visit the campus, which
presumably is costly for parents in terms of time and money. This can also be taken into account when
colleges decide whom to admit.
2Congestion in the telephone market was costly for program directors who worried that their offer would
be held the whole match day and then rejected in the last moments, leaving them to fill the position in
a hectic “aftermarket” with only a few leftover candidates. As an example of offer strategy, the directors
of one internship program decided to make their first offers (for their five positions) to numbers 1, 2, 3, 5,
and 12 on their rank-order list of candidates, with the rationale that 3, 5, and 12 had indicated that they
would accept immediately and that 1 and 2 were so attractive as to be worth taking chances on. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that promises to accept an offer were binding. The market was relatively small, and as
one program director mentioned: “you see these people again.”
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for economics graduate students. Using this service, students can send signals to up to two
employers to indicate their interest in receiving an interview at the annual Allied Social
Science Associations meeting. Coles et al. (2010) provide suggestive evidence that sending a
signal of interest increases the chances of receiving an interview. Since interviews take place
over a single weekend, departments typically interview about twenty candidates out of hun-
dreds of applicants, which suggests that most departments must strategically choose from
among their candidates that are above the bar.3 Though not labor markets, some online
dating websites allow participants to send signals to potential partners. For example in the
matchmaking service of the website “Hot or Not,” participants can send each other virtual
flowers that purportedly increase the chances of receiving a positive response.4 In a field
experiment on a major Korean online dating website, Lee et al. (2009) study the effect of a
user attaching one of a limited number of “virtual roses” to a date request. They find that
users of both genders are more likely to accept a request when a virtual rose is attached.5
These examples all share three important features. First, in each case substantial frictions
lead to market congestion: employers (or colleges or dating partners) are unable to give full
attention to all possible candidates when making decisions. Second, applicants are ready
to provide information about their preferences over employers. Third, employers value this
preference information and are prepared to act on it.
For employers to take useful action, preference signals must be credible. But simply
declaring one’s interest typically bears almost no cost, and job seekers have an incentive to
indicate particular interest to many employers, regardless of how strong their preferences
towards these employers actually are. Hence, absent any credibility guarantee, employers
may struggle to discern which preference information is sincere and which is simply cheap
talk. So while candidates may wish to signal their preferences, and employers may value
3Similar mechanisms exist for non-academic jobs. For example, Skydeck360, a student-operated com-
pany at Harvard, offers a signaling service for MBA students in their search for internships and full-time
jobs. Each registered student can send up to ten signals to employers via their secure website. (See
http://skydeck360.posterous.com for detail.)
4In this case the number of flowers one may send is unlimited, but each flower is costly. Signals of interest
may be helpful in dating markets because pursuing partners is costly. At the very least, each user may be
limited in the number of serious dates she can have in a given period. “As James Hong from HotorNot
tells it, his virtual flower service has three components: there’s the object itself represented by a graphical
flower icon, there’s the gesture of someone sending the flower to their online crush, and finally, there’s the
trophy effect of everyone else being able to see that you got a flower. People on HotorNot are paying
$10 to send the object of their affection a virtual flower – which is a staggering 3-4x what you might pay
for a real flower!” (from http://www.viralblog.com/research/why-digital-consumers-buy-virtual-goods/) See
http://www.hotornot.com/m/?flowerBrochure=1 for a description of HotorNot’s virtual flower offerings.
5This dating website targets people looking for marriage partners, rather than people who want many
dates. Hence, dates may be perceived as particularly costly, so users must decide carefully on whom to
“spend” a date. The study found that candidates of average attractiveness, who may worry that date offers
are only “safety” offers, are particularly responsive to signals of special interest.
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learning candidate preferences, inability to credibly convey information may prevent any
gains from preference signaling from being realized.
In this paper, we investigate how a signaling mechanism that limits the number of signals
a job seeker may send can overcome the credibility problem and improve the welfare of market
participants. We develop a model that can account for the three stylized facts mentioned
above. In our model, firms make offers to workers, but the number of offers they may make
is limited, so that firms must carefully select the workers to whom they make offers. We
focus on the strategic question of offer choice and abstract away the question of acquiring
information that determines preferences. Hence, we assume that each agent knows her own
preferences over agents on the other side of the market, but is uncertain of the preferences
of other agents.
In the simplest version of our model, we assume that both worker and firm preferences
are idiosyncratic and uniformly distributed. Workers have the opportunity to send a signal
to one firm, where each signal is binary in nature and does not transmit any further infor-
mation. Firms observe their signals, but not the signals of other firms, and then each firm
simultaneously makes exactly one offer to a worker. Finally, workers choose offers from those
available to them. We focus on symmetric equilibria in anonymous strategies to eliminate
any coordination devices beyond the signaling mechanism.
We show that, in expectation, introducing a signaling mechanism increases both the
number of matches as well as the welfare of workers. Intuitively, when firms make offers
to workers who send them signals, these offers are unlikely to overlap, leading to a higher
expected number of matches. Furthermore, workers are not only more likely to be matched,
but are also more likely to be matched to a firm they prefer the most. On the other hand,
when a firm makes an offer to a worker who has signaled it, this creates strong competition
for firms who would like to make an offer to that same worker because, for example, they
rank that worker highest. Hence, by responding to signals, that is, being more likely to make
offers to workers who have signaled them, firms may generate a negative spillover on other
firms. Consequently, the effect on firm welfare from introducing a signaling mechanism
is ambiguous; welfare for a firm depends on the balance between individual benefit from
responding to signals and the negative spillover generated by other firms responding to
signals. Furthermore, we show that the degree to which a firm responds to signals is a case
of strategic complements. When one firm responds more to signals, it becomes riskier for
other firms to make offers to workers who have not sent them signals. Consequently, multiple
equilibria, with varying responsiveness to signals, may exist. These equilibria can be welfare
ranked: workers prefer equilibria where firms respond more to signals, while firms prefer the
equilibria where they respond less.
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We also study an extension in which workers have correlated preferences. In this setting
a worker may not necessarily signal to her overall most preferred firm. This implies that
firms cannot be certain that an offer made to a worker who sent a signal will be accepted.
Nonetheless, for a class of correlated preferences we show that the introduction of a signaling
mechanism increases the expected number of matches and the welfare of workers.
To understand when a signaling mechanism might be most helpful, we compare perfor-
mance across market settings. To do this, we focus on a simpler environment where agents
care about getting a match, but not the quality of the match. Hence, the value of intro-
ducing a signaling mechanism is simply the expected increase in the number of matches.
For such an environment, we find that the value of a signaling mechanism is maximal for
balanced markets ; that is, markets where the number of firms and workers are of roughly the
same magnitude. We further show that the increase in the number of matches is roughly
homogenous of degree one in the number of firms and workers. That is, signaling mechanisms
are equally important for large and small markets in terms of the expected increase in the
fraction of matched participants.
Our approach is related to several strands of literature. A standard interpretation of
signaling and its effectiveness is that applicants have private information that is pertinent
to how valuable an employee they would be. For example, in Spence’s signaling model
(Spence, 1973), applicants use wasteful costly signals, such as education, to signal their
type, such as their ability.6 More recently, Avery and Levin (2009) model early application
in US college admissions as a way for students to signal college-specific quality, such as
enthusiasm for a particular college. In their model, colleges explicitly derive more utility
from having enthusiastic students in their freshman class than they do from other, equally
able students. By contrast, in our model we abstract away from such motives and instead
show how congestion, stemming from the explicit monetary or opportunity costs of making
offers, can generate room for useful preference signaling.
A more closely related strand of literature is that of strategic information transmission,
or “cheap talk,” between a sender and receiver, introduced in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
In our model, however, we consider a multi-stage game with many senders (workers) and
many receivers (firms), where the structure of allowable signals plays a distinctive role. Each
sender must choose the receiver to whom she will send one of her limited, identical signals,
and the scarcity of signals induces credibility. Each receiver knows only whether a sender has
sent a signal to it or not, and receives no additional information. While Crawford and Sobel
6Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009) extend this idea to an environment where agents on both sides of the
market may send signals. Among other findings, they identify general conditions under which the potential
increase in expected output due to the introduction of signaling is offset by the costs of signaling.
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(1982) study a coordination problem between the sender and receiver, our setting includes an
additional coordination problem among receivers who must decide whom to make an offer.
Nevertheless, some features of Crawford and Sobel persist in our model. Signals are “cheap”
in the sense that they do not have a direct influence on agent payoffs. Each agent has only a
limited number of signals, so there is an opportunity cost associated with sending a signal.
Finally, in our model there always exist babbling equilibria where agents ignore signals;
hence, the introduction of a signaling mechanism always enlarges the set of equilibria.
While to our knowledge we are the first to introduce preference signaling in decentralized
markets, papers by Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2008) and Lee and Schwarz (2007)
deal with preference signaling in the presence of centralized clearinghouses.7
In summary, our paper models the introduction of a signaling mechanism in markets
where interviews or offers are costly for firms, either in direct monetary terms or because of
opportunity costs. Our results suggest potentially large welfare gains for workers, and an
increase in the expected total number of matches. Furthermore, as the experience with the
economic job market shows, introducing a signaling mechanism can be a low cost, unintrusive
means of improving maket outcomes. As such we see our paper as part of the larger market
design literature (c.f. Roth, 2008).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins with a simple example, and Sections 3
and 4 discuss the offer game with and without a signaling mechanism, respectively. Section
5 considers the impact of introducing a signaling mechanism on the welfare of agents. In
Section 6 we examine signaling in an environment with correlated agent preferences. Section
7 analyzes the robustness of the welfare results across various market structures. Section 8
concludes.
2 A Simple Example
In this section we lay out a simple example that shows the effects of introducing a signaling
mechanism and highlights some of our main findings. Consider a market with two firms
{f1, f2} and two workers {w1, w2}. For each agent, a match with one’s most preferred
partner from the other side of the market yields payoff 1, while a match with one’s second
choice partner yields x ∈ (0, 1). Remaining unmatched yields payoff 0.
7Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2008) show that the introduction of a signaling technology improves
efficiency of the deferred acceptance algorithm in a school choice problem. Lee and Schwarz (2007) analyze
preference signaling in a match formation process between firms and workers that consists of three steps:
preference signaling, investments in information acquisition, and formation of matches via a centralized clear-
inghouse. They construct a centralized mechanism where workers communicate their complete preferences
to an intermediary, and the intermediary recommends to each firm a subset of workers to interview.
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Ex-ante, agent preferences are random, uniform and independent. That is, for each firm
f , the probability that f prefers worker w1 to worker w2 is one half, as is the probability
that f prefers w2 to w1. Worker preferences over firms are similarly symmetric. Agents learn
their own preferences, but not the preferences of other agents.
We first examine behavior in a game where once agent preferences are realized, each firm
may make a single offer to a worker. Workers then accept at most one of their available
offers. We will examine sequential equilibria, which guarantees that workers accept their
best available offer.
In the unique equilibrium of this game where firm strategies do not depend on the name
of the worker,8 each firm simply makes an offer to its most preferred worker. This follows
because firms cannot discern which worker is more likely to accept an offer. In this congested
market there is a fifty percent chance that both firms make an offer to the same worker, in
which case there will only be one match. Hence, on average there are 1.5 matches, and the
expected payoff for each firm is 3
4
1+ 1
4
0 = 0.75. For workers, if they receive exactly one offer,
it is equally likely to be from their first or second choice firm. There is also a fifty percent
chance that one worker receives two offers, hence attaining a payoff of one while the other
worker receives zero. The expected payoff for each worker is then (2 + x)/4.
We now introduce a signaling mechanism: before firms make offers, each worker may
send a signal to a single firm. Each signal has a binary nature: either a firm receives a signal
from a particular worker or not, and signals do not not transmit any other information. We
focus on non-babbling equilibria, where firms interpret a signal as a sign of being the more
preferred firm of that worker, and workers send a signal to their more preferred firm.9
To analyze firm behavior, note that a firm that receives a signal from its top worker will
make this worker an offer, since it will certainly be accepted. If on the other hand a firm
receives no signals, it again optimally makes an offer to its top worker, as symmetry implies
the workers are equally likely to accept an offer. The interesting strategic decision a firm
must make is when it receives a signal only from its second ranked worker. In this case the
other firm also receives exactly one signal. We say a firm “responds” to the signal if it makes
the signaling worker an offer, and “ignores” the signal if it instead makes an offer to its top
worker, which did not send it a signal.
Suppose f1 prefers w1 to w2 and only w2 sent a signal to f1, which implies w1 sent a
8See Section 3 for a formal definition of anonymous strategies.
9Note that there is no equilibrium where firms expect signals from workers, but interpret them as a
particular lack of interest and hence reduce the probability of making an offer to a signaling worker. If this
were the case, workers would simply not send any signal. There are, however, babbling equilibria where no
information is transmitted, though we will not focus on those in this paper, as they are equivalent to not
having a signaling device.
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signal to f2. Clearly, whenever f1 makes an offer to w2, f1 receives x. Suppose f1 instead
makes an offer to w1, who sent a signal to f2. If f2 responds to signals, then f2 also makes
an offer to w1, which w1 will accept, hence leaving f1 a payoff of 0. If f2 ignores signals,
then there is still a fifty percent chance that w1 is actually f2’s first choice, in which case an
offer is tendered and accepted, so that f1 again receives 0. Otherwise, f1 receives 1. Table
1 summarizes f1’s payoffs conditional on receiving a signal from its second ranked worker,
and the strategies of f2.
Table 1: Firm f1’s payoffs conditional on receiving a signal from
its second ranked worker.
f1 \ f2 Respond Ignore
Respond x x
Ignore 0 1/2
Table 1 shows that strategies of firms are strategic complements. If a firm responds to
signals, then the other firm is weakly better off from responding to signals as well. In this
example, if f2 switches from the action ignore (not making an offer to a second choice worker
who has signaled) to the safe action of responding (making an offer to a second choice worker
who has signaled), then f1 optimally also takes the safe action of responding.
Turning to equilibrium analysis, note that if x > 0.5 there is a unique equilibrium in
which both firms respond to signals. When x < 0.5, that is when the value of the first choice
worker is much greater than that of the second ranked worker, there exist two equilibria in
pure strategies. In the first, both firms respond to signals (Respond-Respond) and in the
second both firm ignore signals (Ignore-Ignore).10 Table 2 summarizes welfare properties of
these equilibria. Note that the expected firm and worker payoffs, as well as the expected
number of matches when signals are ignored are the same as when there is no signaling
mechanism, since agent actions in these two settings are identical.11
Whenever there are multiple equilibria (x < 0.5), we can rank them in terms of firm wel-
fare, worker welfare, and the expected number of matches. Workers and firms are opposed in
10There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium whenever there are two pure strategy equilibria. Properties
of this equilibrium coincide with those in the equilibrium where both firms respond to signals.
11When both firms respond to signals, since each firm has a fifty percent chance of receiving a signal
from its first choice worker, half the time this strategy yields payoff of one. Otherwise a firm has a 1/4
chance of receiving a signal from its second choice worker only, yielding a payoff of x. With a 1/4 chance a
firm receives no signal, in which case it makes an offer to its first choice worker, who will accept with fifty
percent probability (whenever she is not the first choice worker of the other firm). Hence, expected firm
payoffs are 121 +
1
4x +
1
4
1
21 =
5+2x
8 . Payoffs for workers can similarly be calculated given these outcomes.
Furthermore, when one firm receives all signals (which happens half the time) there is a fifty percent chance
of firms making offers to the same worker, and hence, of only one match occuring, so the expected number
of matches is 141 +
3
42 =
7
4 .
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Table 2: Firm payoffs, worker payoffs, and number of matches
when both firms use the same strategy.
Firm Payoffs Worker Payoffs Number of Matches
Respond-Respond (5 + 2x)/8 3/4 7/4
Ignore-Ignore 3/4 (2 + x)/4 3/2
their preferences over equilibria: workers prefer the equilibrium in which both firms respond
to signals while firms prefer the equilibrium in which they both ignore signals. Intuitively,
while one firm may privately gain from responding to a signal, such an action may nega-
tively affect the other firm. The expected number of matches in the equilibrium when both
firms respond to signals is always greater than in the equilibrium when both firms ignore the
signals.
These welfare results enable us to study the effects of introducing a signaling mechanism,
as outcomes in the offer game without signals are identical to those when both firms ignore
signals (even if the Ignore-Ignore equilibrium does not exist). The expected number of
matches and the welfare of workers in the offer game with signals in any non-babbling
equilibrium are greater than in the offer game with no signals. The welfare of firms changes
ambiguously with the introduction of a signaling mechanism. We now show that these results
generalize.
3 The Offer Game with No Signals
3.1 General Notation
In this paper we aim for a simple hiring model in which we can highlight the role of agents
being able to credibly signal preferences in the presence of congestion. We have a market
with a set of firms, a set of workers, and a distribution over firm and worker preferences.
Each firm has the capacity to hire at most one worker, and each worker can fill at most
one position. We examine an extreme form of congestion: each firm may make at most one
offer to hire a worker, where we implicitly assume that workers have applied to all firms. In
the offer game with no signals, firms make an offer based on the limited knowledge of the
distribution of worker preferences. In the second setting, the offer game with signals, before
offers are made, each worker has the opportunity to send one costless signal to a firm, who
may use this signal to partially infer worker preferences. In the web appendix we show that
the main results carry over when firms have multiple positions and workers can send several
signals.
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Let F = {f1, . . . , fF} be the set of firms, and W = {w1, . . . , wW} be the set of workers,
with |F| = F and |W| = W . We consider markets with at least two firms and two workers.
Firms and workers have preferences over each other. For each firm f , let Θf be the set of
all possible preference lists over workers, where θf ∈ Θf is a vector of length W . We use
the convention that the worker of rank one is the most preferred worker, while the worker of
rank W is the least preferred worker. The set of all firm preference profiles is ΘF = (Θf )
F .
Similarly, we define θw, Θw and ΘW for workers. Let Θ ≡ ΘF × ΘW , and let t(·) be the
distribution over preference list profiles.
Firm f with preference list θf values a match with worker w as u(θf , w), where u(θf , ·)
is a von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function. In our model, firms will be symmetric in
the following sense: we assume that a firm’s utility for a match depends only on a worker’s
rank. That is, for any permutation ρ of worker indices, we have u(ρ(θf ), ρ(w)) = u(θf , w).
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Furthermore, all firms have the same utility function u(·, ·). Worker w with preference list
θw values a match with firm f as v(θw, f), where match utility again depends only on rank,
and all workers share the same utility function. Though not essential for our results, we
will assume that workers and firms derive zero utility from being unmatched, and that any
match is preferable to remaining unmatched for all participants. A market is given by the
5-tuple 〈F ,W , t, u, v〉.
For Sections 3-5, we will focus on a simple preference structure: each firm f has pref-
erences over the workers chosen uniformly, randomly and independently from the set of all
strict preference orderings over all workers. Worker preferences are analogously chosen; that
is, there is no correlation in preferences. This will make the problem symmetric and easy to
analyze.
In Section 6 we will relax this assumption, and consider the case in which preferences of
workers over firms may exhibit correlation. In the web appendix we consider a more involved
symmetric model where firms have several slots to fill, and workers can send multiple signals.
3.2 The Offer Game with No Signals
We first examine behavior in the absence of a signaling mechanism. Play proceeds as follows.
After preferences of firms and workers are realized, each firm simultaneously makes an offer
to at most one worker. Workers then choose at most one offer from those available to them.
Sequential rationality ensures that workers will always select the best available offer. Hence,
12Let ρ : {1, . . . ,W} → {1, . . . ,W} be a permutation. Abusing notation, we apply ρ to preference lists,
workers, and sets of workers such that the permutation applies to the worker indices. For example, suppose
W = 3, ρ(1) = 2, ρ(2) = 3, and ρ(3) = 1. Then we have θf = (w1, w2, w3) ⇒ ρ(θf ) = (w2, w3, w1) and
ρ(w1) = w2.
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we take the workers’ behavior in the last stage as given and focus on the reduced game with
only firms as strategic players.
Once its preference list θf (f ’s type) is realized, firm f decides whether and to whom
to make an offer. Firm f may use a mixed strategy denoted by σf which maps the set of
preference lists to the set of distributions over the union of workers with the no-offer option,
denoted by N ; that is σf : Θf → ∆(W ∪N ).13 We denote a profile of all firms’ strategies
as σF = (σf1 , ...σfF ), and the set of firm f ’s strategies as Σf .
Let the function pif : (Σf )
F × Θ → R denote the payoff of firm f as a function of
firm strategies and realized agent types. We are now ready to define the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the offer game with no signals.
Definition 1. Strategy profile σˆF is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the offer game with no
signals, if for all f ∈ F and θ¯f ∈ Θf the strategy σˆf maximizes the profit of firm f of type
θ¯f , that is
σˆf (θ¯f ) ∈ arg maxσ
f
∈Σf Eθ−f (pif (σf , σˆ−f , θ) | θ¯f ).
We focus on equilibria in which firm strategies are anonymous; that is, they depend
only on workers’ ranks within a firm’s preference list. This rules out strategies that rely
on worker indices, eliminating any coordination linked to the identity of workers. As an
example, “always make an offer to my second-ranked worker” is an anonymous strategy,
while “always make an offer to the worker called w2” is not.
Definition 2. Firm f ’s strategy σf is anonymous if for any permutation ρ, and for any
preference profile θf ∈ Θf , we have σf (ρ(θf )) = ρ(σf (θf )).
When deciding whom to make an offer, firms must consider both the utility from hiring a
specific worker and the likelihood that this worker will accept an offer. Because preferences of
both firms and workers are independently and uniformly chosen from all possible preference
orderings, and since firms use anonymous strategies, an offer to any worker will be accepted
with equal probability. Hence, each firm optimally makes an offer to the highest-ranked
worker on its preference list. Indeed, this is the unique equilibrium when firms use anonymous
strategies.
Proposition 1. The unique equilibrium of the offer game with no signals when firms use
anonymous strategies and workers accept the best available offer is σf (θf ) = θ
1
f for all f ∈ F
and θf ∈ Θf .
13In other words, f selects elements of a W -dimensional simplex; σf (θf ) ∈ ∆W , where ∆W = {x ∈ RW+1 :∑W+1
i=1 xi = 1, and xi ≥ 0 for each i}.
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Note that the above statement requires that firm strategies be anonymous only in equi-
librium. Firm deviations that do not satisfy the anonymity assumption are still allowed.
As seen in the example in Section 2, in this equilibrium there might be considerable lack of
coordination, leaving many firms and workers unmatched.14
4 The Offer Game with Signals
We now modify the game so that each worker may send a “signal” to exactly one firm. A
signal is a fixed message; that is, the only decision of workers is whether and to whom to
send a signal. No decision can be made about the content of the signal. Note that the signal
does not directly affect the utility a firm derives from a worker, as the firm’s utility from
hiring a worker is determined by how high the firm ranks that worker. However, the signal
of a worker may affect a firm’s beliefs over whether that worker is likely to accept an offer.
Since we have a congested market where firms can only make one offer, these beliefs may
affect the firm’s decision of whom to make an offer. The offer game with signals proceeds in
three stages:
1. Agents’ preferences are realized. Each worker decides whether to send a signal, and to
which firm. Signals are sent simultaneously, and are observed only by firms who have
received them.
2. Each firm makes an offer to at most one worker; offers are made simultaneously.
3. Each worker accepts at most one offer from the set of offers she receives.
Once again, sequential rationality ensures that workers will always select the best available
offer. Hence, we take this behavior for workers as given and focus on the reduced game
consisting of the first two stages.
In the first stage, each worker sends a signal to a firm, or else chooses not to send a
signal. A mixed strategy for worker w is a map from the set of all possible preference lists
to the set of distributions over the union of firms and the no-signal option, denoted by N ;
that is, σw : Θw → ∆(F ∪ N ). In the second stage, each firm observes the set of workers
that sent it a signal, WS ⊂ W , and based on these signals forms beliefs µf (·|WS) about the
preferences of workers. Each firm, based on these beliefs as well as its preferences, decides
whether and to whom to make an offer. A mixed strategy of firm f is a map from the set of
all possible preference lists, Θf , and the set of all possible combinations of received signals,
14Note that our model of a congested market is reminiscent of the micro-foundations for the matching
function in the search literature (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000).
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2W , which is the set of all subsets of workers, to the set of distributions over the union of
workers and the no-offer option. That is, σf : Θf × 2W → ∆(W ∪N ). We denote a profile
of all worker and firm strategies as σW = (σw1 , ...σwW ) and σF = (σf1 , ...σfF ) respectively.
The payoff to firm f is a function of firm and worker strategies and realized agent types,
which we again denote as pif : (Σw)
W × (Σf )F × Θ → R. Similarly, define the payoff of
workers as piw : (Σw)
W × (Σf )F × Θ → R. As the offer game with signals is a multi-stage
game of incomplete information, we consider sequential equilibrium as the solution concept.
Definition 3. The strategy profile σˆ = (σˆW , σˆF ) and posterior beliefs µˆf (·|WS) for each
firm f and each subset of workers WS ⊂ W are a sequential equilibrium if
• for any w ∈ W , θ¯w ∈ ΘW : σˆw(θ¯w) ∈ arg maxσw∈ΣwEθ−w(piw(σw, σˆ−w, θ) | θ¯w),
• for any f ∈ F , θ¯f ∈ Θf , WS ⊂ W :
σˆf (θ¯f ,WS) ∈ arg maxσf∈Σf Eθ−f (pif (σf , σˆ−f , θ) | θ¯f ,WS, µˆf ),
where σˆ−a denotes the strategies of all agents except a, for a = w, f , and beliefs are defined
using Bayes’ rule.15
We again focus on equilibria where agents use anonymous strategies, thereby eliminating
unrealistic sources of coordination.
Definition 4. Firm f ’s strategy σf is anonymous if for any permutation ρ, preference profile
θf ∈ Θf , and subset of workers WS ⊂ W who send f a signal, we have σf (ρ(θf ), ρ(WS)) =
ρ(σf (θf ,WS)). Worker w’s strategy σw is anonymous if for any permutation ρ and preference
profile θw ∈ Θw, we have σw(ρ(θw)) = ρ(σw(θw)).
4.1 Equilibrium Analysis
To analyze equilibrium behavior, we first turn to the workers’ choice of whether and to whom
to send a signal. In any symmetric equilibrium in which workers send signals and signals
are interpreted as a sign of interest by firms and hence increase the chance of receiving an
offer, each worker sends her signal to her most preferred firm. Since sending a signal to any
firm will lead to identical probabilities of receiving an offer, it is optimal for each worker
to simply send its signal to its highest ranked firm (see Proposition 4 in Section 6, which
provides the analog of this statement for a more general setup).
15As usual in a sequential equilibrium, permissible off-equilibrium beliefs are defined by considering the
limits of completely mixed strategies.
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Note that babbling equilibria in which no information is transmitted via signals also exist.
In one form of such equilibria, firms ignore signals and workers randomize any signals they
send across firms. In another version, workers do not send signals, and firms interpret unex-
pected signals negatively. Note however that equilibria where firms interpret off-equilibrium
signals negatively fail to survive standard equilibrium refinements (see Section 6 for details).
Finally, “perverse” equilibria, where firms interpret signals negatively, e.g. as a sign of a
particular lack of interest in such a position, and workers nevertheless send such signals do
not exist. This is because workers may always opt against sending a signal. We focus on
non-babbling equilibria, in which each worker sends a signal only to her most preferred firm.
Hence, we have pinned down worker equilibrium behavior: workers send a signal to their
highest ranked firm, and workers accept the best available offer. We now examine offers of
firms in the second stage of the game, taking the strategies of workers and beliefs of firms
about interpreting signals as given.16
Call f ’s most preferred worker Tf (f ’s top-ranked worker). Consider a firm f that has
received signals from a subset of workers WS ⊂ W . Call f ’s most preferred worker in this
subset Sf (f ’s most preferred signaling worker).
Whenever workers signal to their most preferred firm, and other firms use anonymous
strategies, f ’s offer choice is reduced to a binary decision between making an offer to the
top ranked worker, Tf , and the most preferred (potentially) lower-ranked worker who has
signaled it, Sf . When the two coincide, that is when Tf = Sf , there is no tradeoff, and firm
f will make an offer to this worker. The expected payoff to f from making an offer to Tf or
Sf (whichever yields greater payoff) is strictly greater than the payoff from making an offer
to any other worker. This follows from the symmetry of worker preferences and strategies
and the anonymity of firm strategies: for any two workers who sent a signal, f ’s expectation
that these workers will accept an offer is identical. Hence, if f makes an offer to a worker
who sent a signal, it should make that offer to the worker it prefers the most among them.
The same logic holds for any two workers who have not sent a signal. (Propositions A2 and
A3 in Appendix A.2 provide a rigorous argument for the above statements).
This suggests a special kind of strategy for firms, which we will call a cutoff strategy.
Definition 5 (Cutoff Strategies). Strategy σf is a cutoff strategy for firm f if ∃j1, . . . , jW ∈
{1, . . . ,W}, such that for any θf ∈ Θf and any set WS of workers who sent a signal,
σf (θf ,WS) =
{
Sf if rankθf (Sf ) ≤ j|WS |
Tf otherwise.
16Note that in any non-babbling symmetric equilibrium, all information sets for firms are realized with
positive probability. Hence, firm beliefs are determined by Bayes’ Law: if a firm receives a signal from a
worker, it believes that worker ranks the firm first in her preference list.
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We call (j1, . . . , jW ) f ’s cutoff vector, which has as its components cutoffs for each positive
number |WS| of received signals.
A firm f which employs a cutoff strategy need only look at the rank of the most preferred
worker who sent it a signal, conditional on the number of signals f has received. If the rank
of this worker is below a certain cutoff (lower ranks are better since one is the most preferred
rank), then the firm makes an offer to this most preferred signaling worker Sf . Otherwise the
firm makes an offer to its overall top ranked worker Tf . Cutoffs may in general depend on the
number of signals the firm receives. This is because the number of signals received provides
information about the signals the other firms received. This in turn affects the behavior of
other firms and hence the optimal decision for firm f . Note that any cutoff strategy is, by
definition, an anonymous strategy.
While we defined cutoffs as integers, we can extend the definition to include all real
numbers in the range (1,W ) by letting a cutoff j+λ, where λ ∈ (0, 1), correspond to mixing
between cutoff j and cutoff j + 1 with probabilities 1− λ and λ respectively.17
Cutoff strategies are not only intuitive but also optimal strategies for firms. Whenever
other firms use anonymous strategies and workers signal to their most preferred firms, for
any strategy of firm f there exists a cutoff strategy that provides firm f with a weakly higher
expected payoff (see Proposition A3). This is due to the fact that the preferences of firms
and strategies of workers are symmetric. Consequently, the probability that firm f ’s offer
to Tf or Sf will be accepted depends only on the number of signals firm f receives, and not
on the identity of the signaling workers. Hence, if f finds it optimal to make an offer to
Sf , it will certainly make an offer to a more preferred Sf , provided the number of signals it
receives is the same. The equilibrium results in this paper will all involve firms using cutoff
strategies.
Since cutoff strategies can be represented by cutoff vectors, we can impose a natural
partial order on them: firm f ’s cutoff strategy σ′f is greater than cutoff strategy σf if all
cutoffs of σ′f are weakly greater than all cutoffs of σf and at least one of them is strictly
greater. We say that firm f responds more to signals than firm f ′ when σf is greater than
σf ′ .
We now examine how a firm should adjust its behavior in response to changes in the
behavior of opponents. We find that responding to signals is a case of strategic complements.
Proposition 2 (Strategic Complements). Suppose workers send signals to their most pre-
ferred firms and accept their best available offer, and suppose all firms use cutoff strategies
17This is equivalent to f making offers to Sf when Sf is ranked better than j, randomizing between Tf
and Sf when Sf has rank exactly j, and making offers to Tf otherwise.
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and firm f uses a cutoff strategy that is a best response. If one of the other firms responds
more to signals, then the best response for firm f is to also weakly respond more to signals.
When other firms make offers to workers who have signaled to them, it is risky for firm
f to make an offer to a worker who has not signaled to it. Such a worker has signaled to
another firm, which is more inclined to make her an offer. The greater this inclination on the
part of the firm’s opponents, the riskier it is for firm f to make an offer to its most preferred
overall worker Tf . Hence as a response, firm f is also more inclined to make an offer to its
most preferred worker among those who sent a signal, namely Sf .
The strategic complements result allows us to apply Theorem 5 from Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) to demonstrate the existence of symmetric equilibria in pure cutoff strategies
with smallest and largest cutoffs (see the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A.1 for details).
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium Existence). In the offer game with signals, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium in pure cutoff strategies where 1) workers signal to their most preferred firms and
accept their best available offer and 2) firms use symmetric cutoff strategies. Furthermore,
there exist pure symmetric equilibria with smallest and largest cutoffs.
5 The Welfare Effects of Introducing a Signaling Mech-
anism
We have analyzed the unique equilibrium in the offer game with no signals, and we have
studied symmetric equilibria in markets with a signaling mechanism. We focused on non-
babbling equilibria where firms interpret signals of workers as a sign of interest, and hence
each worker sends a signal to her most preferred firm. In this section we address the effect
of introducing a signaling mechanism on the market outcome. We consider three outcome
measures: the number of matches in the market, the welfare of firms and the welfare of
workers, where for agent welfare comparisons we consider Pareto ex-ante expected utility as
our criterion.
Our analysis begins with an incremental approach: we first study the effect of a single
firm increasing its cutoff, that is, responding more to signals. We then rank various signaling
equilibria in terms of their outcomes. Finally, we address how the introduction of a signaling
mechanism impacts the three measures of welfare.
The expected welfare for a firm f and a worker w are captured by pif and piw respectively,
where pif , piw : Σ
W
w × ΣFf × Θ → R. Let the function m : (Σw)W × (Σf )F × Θ → R denote
the expected total number of matches in the market as a function of agent strategies and
types. In this section we restrict the analysis to cutoff strategies.
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Consider the offer game with signals, in which workers send their signal to their first
choice firms, and firms interpret these signals as signs of interest. Fix the strategies of all
other firms, and assume that one firm changes its strategy to respond more to signals. How
does this affect the number of matches, and the workers and firms welfare?
Proposition 3. Consider any strategy profile in which firms use cutoff strategies, workers
send signals to their most preferred firms, and workers accept their best available offer. Fix
the strategies of all firms but f as σ−f . Let firm f ’s strategy σ′f differ from σf only in that
σ′f responds more to signals, that is, has higher cutoffs than σf . Then
• The expected number of matches increases. That is, Eθ[m(σ′f , σ−f , θ) ] ≥ Eθ[m(σf , σ−f , θ) ].
• The expected payoff of each worker increases. That is, for each w ∈ W, Eθ[ piw(σ′f , σ−f , θ) ] ≥
Eθ[ piw(σf , σ−f , θ) ].
• The expected payoffs of all firms but f decrease. That is, for each f ′ ∈ −f , Eθ[ pif ′(σ′f , σ−f , θ) ] ≤
Eθ[ pif ′(σf , σ−f , θ) ] (negative spillover on opponent firms).
When at least one firm in −f responds to signals, that is has a cutoff strictly greater than
one for some number of received signals, then all inequalities are strict.
To understand the first result, observe that when firm f switches its offer from its first
choice worker Tf to its most preferred signaling worker Sf , it is the other offers received
by these two workers that determine the impact on the total number of matches. If both
workers have other offers, or if neither has another offer, the number of matches is unaffected.
Only when exactly one of these two workers has another offer does f ’s switch from Tf to Sf
affect the number of matches. However, conditional on exactly one of these having another
offer, it is weakly more likely to be Tf , as this worker has signaled to another firm, while Sf
has not. Furthermore, Tf is strictly more likely than Sf to have another offer when at least
one other firm responds to signals. Hence, making an offer to Sf leads to a greater expected
total number of matches.
In addition to creating more matches in expectation, a firm responding more to signals
unambiguously increases expected worker welfare. Note that when firm f changes its offer
from Tf to Sf , then worker Sf receives an offer from her first choice firm, while worker Tf
loses an offer from a firm she ranks second or worse. Hence, when the number of matches is
unchanged, average worker welfare increases. Furthermore, it is more likely that the number
of matches increases rather than decreases, and once more each match ‘gained’ is one where
a worker receives her first choice firm, while each match ‘lost’ is one where a worker receives
a firm of her second choice or worse. It follows that in expectation, each worker gains when
a firm starts responding more to signals.
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In contrast, a firm f responding more to signals has a negative effect on the welfare of
other firms. When firm f makes an offer to Tf , this offer may be rejected, as Tf may prefer
other firms to firm f . But an offer from f to Sf creates “stiff” competition for competing
firms, since this worker will accept f ’s offer with certainty, and offers from other firms will
be rejected. Additionally, f ’s switch from Tf to Sf may only be pivotal for opponent firms
making “risky” offers to their top ranked workers. Such offers are more likely to be made
to Sf than to Tf since by signaling, Sf has indicated she prefers f. Hence, in addition to
creating stiffer competition for −f , f ’s switch from Tf to Sf creates more competition for
−f . The combination of these two effects gives the negative spillover result.
We now use the incremental welfare results to compare welfare across equilibria. The
following corollary states that for all three of our welfare measures, there is a clear ranking
of any two symmetric equilibria that can be ordered by their cutoffs.
Corollary 1. Consider any two symmetric cutoff strategy equilibria where in one equilibrium
firms have greater cutoffs (respond more to signals). Compared to the equilibrium with lower
cutoffs, in the equilibrium with greater cutoffs we have the following: (i) the expected number
of matches is weakly greater, (ii) workers have weakly higher expected payoffs, and (iii) firms
have weakly lower expected payoffs.
Corollary 1 states that firms and workers are opposed in their preferences over equilibria.18
When multiple symmetric equilibria exist, workers prefer the equilibrium that involves firms
responding the most to signals, that is the greatest cutoffs, while firms prefer the equilibrium
with the lowest cutoffs.
We can now address the effect of adding a signaling mechanism to an offer game with
no signals. We will assume that the equilibrium once the signaling mechanism is introduced
is one of the symmetric non-babbling equilibria. Using the results above, we can show that
introducing a signaling mechanism weakly increases the welfare of workers and the expected
number of matches. Furthermore, the inequality is strict if firms respond to signals at all;
that is, if for at least some number of signals, firms use strategies that call for an offer to a
worker who signaled, Sf , even when she is not the first choice worker Tf . In contrast, firm
welfare cannot be compared. As the example in Section 2 illustrates, firm welfare may be
higher with or without a signaling mechanism. The following theorem encapsulates these
results.
18Suppose that when we have a class of cutoff strategies that are strategically equivalent, we allow firms to
only use the lowest one. For example, when we have W workers, a firm with k > 1 signals may have cutoffs
of W − k + 1 and W − k + 2 that are strategically equivalent: the firm always makes an offer to Sf . When
we focus on the lowest strategically equivalent cutoff, then all inequalities of Corollary 1 are strict.
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Theorem 2 (Welfare). Consider any non-babbling symmetric equilibrium of the offer game
with signals in which for at least some number of signals, firm strategies call for an offer to
the signaling worker, Sf , even when she is not the first choice worker Tf . Then the following
three statements hold.
i. The expected number of matches is strictly greater than in the unique equilibrium of
the offer game with no signals.
ii. The expected welfare of workers is strictly greater than in the unique equilibrium of the
offer game with no signals.
iii. The welfare of firms may be greater or smaller than in the unique equilibrium of the
offer game with no signals.
When introducing a signaling mechanism hurts firm welfare, it is because the negative
externality outweighs the individual firm benefit from responding to signals. The theorem
discusses the case in which firms respond to at least some degree to signals in equilibrium.
Note that when there is a symmetric non-babbling equilibrium where firms ignore signals,
then this equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a market without a signaling mechanism, so
that agents are no worse off with the signaling mechanism. But provided firms respond even
minimally to signals in equilibrium, with the introduction of a signaling mechanism, the
expected number of matches and the expected welfare for workers increase unambiguously.
6 Block Correlation
So far we assumed that worker preferences are symmetric, uniform and independent. In
non-babbling sequential equilibria, this implies that workers send their signal to their most
preferred firm, and a firm that received a signal could be certain that an offer would be
accepted. In this section we relax the assumption that worker preferences are uncorrelated.
More precisely, we consider a market where firms can be partitioned in blocks, so that all
workers agree which block contains the most desirable firms, which block the second most
desirable set of firms and so on. However, within a block, workers may have idiosyncratic
preferences over firms. Hence, for this section we consider markets where agent preferences
are block-correlated.
Definition 6. A block-correlated market is a market 〈F ,W , t, u, v〉 such that for a partition
F1, . . . ,FB of the firms into blocks, ordinal preferences (as encompassed in t(·)) are such
that
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1. For any b < b′, where b, b′ ∈ {1, . . . , B}, each worker prefers every firm in block Fb to
any firm in block Fb′ ;
2. Each worker’s preferences within each block Fb are uniform and independent; and
3. Each firm’s preferences over workers are uniform and independent.
We call distributions t(·) that satisfy the criteria in Definition 6 block uniform. The
environment analyzed in previous sections is a special case of block-correlated markets,
where there is only one block of firms. Block-correlated markets are meant to capture the
notion that many two-sided markets are segmented. That is, workers may largely agree on
the ranking of blocks on the other side of the market, but vary in their preferences within
each block. For example, workers might agree on the set of firms that constitute the “top
tier” of the market; however within that tier, preferences are influenced by factors specific
to each worker.
We again focus on equilibria where agents use anonymous strategies. For firms we main-
tain the notion of anonymous strategies introduced in Definitions 2 and 4. For workers we
only consider permutations PB that permute firm orderings within blocks; that is, permu-
tation ρ ∈ PB if for any firm f and any block b, if f∈ F b then ρ(f)∈ F b
Definition 7. Worker w’s strategy σw is anonymous if for any permutation ρ ∈ PB and
preference profile θw ∈ Θw, we have σw(ρ(θw)) = ρ(σw(θw)).
As previously, let us first consider the offer game with no signals. Since worker preferences
are still uniformly distributed there is again a unique equilibrium where firms use anonymous
strategies: each firm optimally makes an offer to the highest-ranked worker on its preference
list.
We now turn to the offer game with signals, where we will be interested in equilibria
where firms within each block play symmetric, anonymous strategies. That is, if firm f and
firm f ′ belong to the same block Fb, for some b ∈ {1, ..., B}, they play the same anonymous
strategies and have the same beliefs. We call such firm strategies and firm beliefs block-
symmetric. We denote equilibria where firm strategies and firm beliefs are block-symmetric
and worker strategies are anonymous and symmetric as block-symmetric equilibria. Before we
can characterize the set of block-symmetric equilibria, we discuss the strategies of workers,
who must choose whether to send a signal, and if so, to which firm. In block-symmetric
equilibria, firms within each block Fb use the same anonymous strategies. Hence, we can
denote the ex-ante probability of a worker w receiving an offer from a firm in block Fb,
conditional on w sending and not sending a signal to it as psb and p
ns
b correspondingly. We
also denote the equilibrium probability that a worker sends her signal to a firm in block Fb
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as αb, where αb ∈ [0, 1] and
∑B
b=1 αb ≤ 1, where of course the αb’s are not independent as
each worker may only send at most one signal.
The following proposition characterizes worker strategies in all block-symmetric sequen-
tial equilibria that satisfy an analog of Criterion D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987).19
Proposition 4 (Worker Strategies). Consider a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium that
satisfies Criterion D1. Then either
1. Signals do not influence offers: for every b ∈ {1, ..., B}, psb = pnsb or
2. Signals sent in equilibrium increase the chances of receiving an offer: there exists b0 ∈
{1, ..., B} such that psb0 > pnsb0 and
(a) for any b ∈ {1, ..., B} such that αb > 0, we have psb > pnsb , and if a worker sends
her signal to block Fb, she sends her signal to her most preferred firm within Fb,
and
(b) for any b′ ∈ {1, ..., B} such that αb′ = 0, workers’ strategies are optimal for any
off-equilibrium beliefs of firms from block Fb′.
Proposition 4 states that there are two types of block-symmetric equilibria that satisfy
Criterion D1. Equilibria of the first type are babbling, where firms ignore signals. The
outcomes of these equilibria coincide with the outcome in the offer games with no signals.
Consequently, the signaling mechanism adds no value in this case.
In equilibria of the second type, workers send signals only to their most preferred firm in
each block, possibly mixing across these top firms. We show that in equilibrium workers only
send signals to blocks in which firms respond to signals, that is the chances of receiving an
offer from the firm they signaled to is higher than if they had not sent that signal. Moreover,
if in equilibrium worker w is not prescribed to signal to some block Fb′ , then w’s choice of
αb′ = 0 is optimal for any beliefs of firms in block Fb′ . In particular, this strategy would be
optimal even if firms in block Fb′ interpreted signals in the most favorable way for worker
w; i.e., upon receiving a signal from worker w each firm f in Fb′ believes that it is w’s most
preferred firm within block Fb′ .
We call all strategies where a worker who sends a signal to firms in block b sends it to
her most preferred firm in that block best-in-block strategies. We call all beliefs where a firm
19Criterion D1 lets us characterize beliefs when firms receive “unexpected,” or off-equilibrium, signals. See
the proof of Proposition 4 for the definition of our analog of Criterion D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987). Other
refinements could also be used in our equilibrium characterization: for example, we could replace Criterion
D1 with “universal divinity” of Banks and Sobel (1987) or by “never a weak best response” of Cho and
Kreps (1987) without making a change to the statement of Proposition 4.
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interprets a signal from a worker w as indicating it is the most preferred firm of w in that
block best-in-block beliefs. We will now assume that workers use symmetric best-in-block
strategies and that firms have best-in-block beliefs, and examine firm offers in the second
stage of the game.20
An important difference between the single block and multi-block settings is that when
there are multiple blocks, offers to workers who have signaled are no longer guaranteed to
be accepted. This is because a firm that receives a signal knows that while it is the worker’s
most preferred firm in the block, the worker may receive an offer from a firm in a superior
block. Nevertheless, several results about the strategies of firms carry over when we introduce
block correlation. In a block-correlated market, firm f ’s offer choice is again reduced to a
binary decision between Tf and Sf , provided workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies
and firms −f use anonymous strategies. Under these same conditions, cutoff strategies are
again optimal for f . The strategic complements result of Proposition 2 also carries over;
if firms −f use cutoff strategies and workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies, then
when f ′ ∈ −f responds more to cutoffs, f optimally responds more to cutoffs as well (see
Propositions A2, A3, and A4).
The next result establishes the existence of equilibria in block correlated settings in the
offer game with signals. To prove the theorem, we first demonstrate equilibrium existence
while requiring firms to use only cutoff strategies. We then invoke the optimality of cutoffs
result to show that this step is not restrictive.
Theorem 3 (Equilibrium Existence under Block Correlation). There exists a block-symmetric
equilibrium where 1) workers play symmetric best-in-block strategies, and 2) firms play block-
symmetric cutoff strategies.
In contrast to Theorem 1 which established equilibrium existence when there is a single
block, equilibria here may involve mixed strategies for workers; that is, each worker may
signal with positive probability to multiple blocks.
The final result of the section extends the welfare results of Theorem 2. Note that for
the comparisons in the theorem to be strict, we require a block with at least two firms where
in equilibrium, workers send signals with positive probability to that block. Without this
condition, we only have weak comparisons.
20Note that firms have best-in-block beliefs on the equilibrium path in any block-symmetric equilibrium.
In addition, a block-symmetric equilibrium satisfies Criterion D1 if and only if worker strategies remain
optimal if firm off-equilibrium beliefs were best-in-block beliefs. Hence, we will focus on equilibria where
firms have best-in-block beliefs even off the equilibrium path. See the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix
A.2 for details.
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Theorem 4 (Welfare under Block Correlation). Consider any non-babbling block-symmetric
equilibrium of the offer game with signals, in which there is a block Fb with at least two firms
such that αb > 0. Then,
i. The expected number of matches is strictly greater than in the unique equilibrium of
the offer game with no signals.
ii. The expected welfare of workers is strictly greater than in the unique equilibrium of the
offer game with no signals.
iii. The welfare of firms may be greater or smaller than in the unique equilibrium of the
offer game with no signals.
Note that while the welfare comparisons with and without a signaling mechanism gener-
alize to block correlated markets, the welfare comparisons across equilibria (see Corollary 1)
do not generalize. In particular, when there are multiple blocks, when a single firm responds
more to signals, firms in lower ranked blocks may benefit. Hence, we no longer see a purely
negative spillover on other firms, which was a key step in establishing the welfare ranking.21
However, even when workers have correlated preferences, so that receiving a signal does
not translate to a guaranteed match for a firm, we find that introducing a signaling mecha-
nism increases the expected number of matches and the expected welfare of workers.
7 Market Structure and The Value of a Signaling Mech-
anism
In this section, we analyze the effects of introducing a signaling mechanism across different
market structures. More precisely, we study the increase in the expected number of matches
due to the introduction of a signaling mechanism.
To isolate the impact of a signaling mechanism on the number of matches in the market,
we consider a special case where agents want to match, but are nearly indifferent over whom
they match with. That is, firms (and workers) play an (almost) pure coordination game
amongst themselves. Specifically, we consider the cardinal utility from being matched to a
partner as being almost the same across partners. If agent a has a preference profile θa,
agent a prefers to be matched with partner θka, rather than with partner θ
k′
a , k
′ > k, though
21Since offers to workers who have signaled are no longer guaranteed to be accepted, firms making offers
to signaling workers may be affected by f ’s switch from Tf to Sf . In particular, firms in the same or higher
blocks responding to signals will not be affected, but firms in lower blocks responding to signals prefer that
f switch from Tf to Sf . There is a positive spillover on these firms, and negative spillover on all other firms.
23
the difference between utility intensities is very small.22 In addition, there is only one block
of firms, so that agent preferences are uniformly distributed.23
Under these assumptions, there is a unique non-babbling symmetric equilibrium in the
offer game with signals. Each worker sends a signal to her most preferred firm. Each firm
makes an offer to its most preferred worker that has signaled provided the firm receives at
least one signal; otherwise, it makes an offer to its top-ranked worker (see Proposition B1).24
Proposition 1 also applies in this setting; that is, there is a unique equilibrium of the offer
game with no signals.
We denote the expected number of matches in the unique equilibrium in the pure coor-
dination model with signals and with F firms and W workers as mS(F,W ), and without a
signaling mechanism as mNS(F,W ). The increase in expected number of matches from the
introduction of the signaling mechanism, which we term the value of the signaling mecha-
nism, we denote as V (F,W ) ≡ mS(F,W )−mNS(F,W ). Figure 1 graphs 100 · V (F,W )/W
as a function of F for fixed W = 10 and W = 100, and 100 · V (F,W )/F as a function of
W for fixed F = 10 and F = 100. That is, the figure depicts the increase in the expected
number of matches proportional to the size of the side of the market we keep fixed (which
places an upper bound on the total number of possible matches).
The figures suggest that the value of a signaling mechanism is single peaked when varying
one side of the market and holding the other constant. That is, it seems that a signaling
mechanism is most beneficial for balanced markets — markets where the the number of firms
and the number of workers are roughly of the same magnitude. To understand why signaling
may be useful in balanced markets, it is helpful to think about the endpoints. With many
workers and very few firms, firms will almost certainly match with or without the signaling
mechanism, as there is no large coordination problem. With many firms and few workers,
22The “nearly indifferent” condition for firms is that u(W ) > WF
(
1− (1− 1W )F)u(1), where u(1) and
u(W ) are firm utility from matching with first and last ranked workers, respectively. A complete specification
of the setup can be found in Appendix B.2.
23Our pure coordination model has similarities to the “urn-ball” model in the labor literature, concisely
described in a survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001): “Firms play the role of urns and workers play the
role of balls. An urn becomes “productive” when it has ball in it. [. . . ] In the simplest version of this process
U workers know exactly the location of V job vacancies and send one application each. If a vacancy receives
one or more applications it selects an applicant at random and forms a match. The other applicants are
returned to the pool of unemployed workers to apply again.” Our pure coordination model effectively flips
the urn-ball problem around. Workers apply to all jobs, and firms propose the offers. We have a non-random
selection procedure, and of course in our model we study the role of signaling. Perhaps the paper with the
closest market structure to ours is Julien, Kennes and King (2000).
24In this case, one can view the offer game with no signals as the result of the first round of a firm-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. When workers send signals, the result resembles one round of a
worker-proposing deferred acceptance with one exception: firms who received no offer (no signal from any
worker) do get to make an offer.
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Figure 1: Balanced Markets: The proportional increase in the
number of matches due to a signaling mechanism as
we vary the number of firms for a fixed number of
workers (left graphs) and vice versa (right graphs).
the reverse holds: most workers will get offers with or without the signaling mechanism.
Hence, the signaling mechanism offers little benefit at the extremes. Furthermore, Figure 1
suggests that the proportional increase in the expected number of matches remains steady as
market size increases, holding constant the ratio of workers to firms. Proposition 5 describes
these observations precisely.
Proposition 5 (Balanced Markets). Consider markets with F firms and W workers. Then
(i) for fixed W , V (F,W ) attains its maximum value at F = x0W + OW (1), where x0 ≈
1.01211 and (ii) for fixed F , V (F,W ) attains its maximum value at W = y0F + OF (1),
where y0 ≈ 1.8442.
The proof of Proposition 5 involves the calculation of an explicit formula for V (F,W ).
The expected increase in the number of matches can be represented as
V (F,W ) = α(
W
F
)F +OF (1)
or as
V (F,W ) = β(
F
W
)W +OW (1),
where α(·) and β(·) are particular functions and OW (1) and OF (1) denote functions that
are smaller than a constant for large W and for large F respectively. Hence, V (F,W ) is
“almost” homogeneous of degree one for large markets. That is, the proportional increase
25
in the number of matches, V (F,W )/W and V (F,W )/F , is almost homogenous of degree
zero.25 As a consequence, we can evaluate the introduction of the signaling mechanism for a
sample market, and its properties will be preserved for markets of other sizes, but with the
same ratio of firms to workers.
For example, we can use Figure 1 to investigate maximal quantitative gains from the
introduction of the signaling mechanism in large markets. For a fixed number of workers,
the maximum increase in expected number of matches is approximately 15%. Furthermore,
the returns to the signaling mechanism are substantial over a wide range of market conditions.
For example, only when the number of firms outweighs the number of workers by more than
fourfold do the gains from introducing the signaling mechanism drop to below 1%.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
Excessive applications by job market candidates lead to market congestion: employers must
devote resources to evaluate and pursue potential candidates, but cannot give due attention
to all. Evaluation is further complicated because employers must assess which applicants,
many of whom are performing broad searches, are likely to ultimately accept a job offer.
Consequently, applicants are often eager to convey information about their interest in
particular employers, and employers stand ready to act upon such information, if it can be
deemed credible. However, in many markets indicating preferences is cheap, and employers
may struggle to identify which preference information is sincere. This, in turn, may prevent
any potential gains from preference signaling from being realized.
In this paper we examined how a signaling mechanism can overcome this credibility prob-
lem and improve agent welfare. In our model, workers are allowed to send a costless signal
to a single firm. While participation is free and voluntary, this mechanism nevertheless pro-
vides workers with a means of credibly expressing preferences. In a symmetric setting where
agent preferences are uncorrelated, workers will send their signal to their most preferred firm.
Firms use this information as guidance, optimally using cutoff strategies to make offers. We
find that on average, introducing a signaling technology increases both the expected number
of matches as well as the expected welfare of workers. The welfare of firms, on the other
hand, changes ambiguously, because firms responding more to signals may impose a negative
externality on other firms. The results carry over when we consider a model where firms
have many positions, and workers can send multiple signals.
25Note that this result corroborates the stylized fact in the empirical labor literature that the matching
function (the expected number of matches) has a constant return to scale. See, for example, Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001) or Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005).
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We showed that the results hold even when workers have correlated preferences, where
workers agree on the ranking of blocks of firms but vary in their preferences within each
block. In this case firm offers to workers who have signaled will not result in guaranteed
acceptance. This is because workers will no longer send their signal to their most preferred
firm, but rather will mix among the most preferred firms from each block. We showed further
that introducing a signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets, that is,
markets in which the number of firms and the number of workers are of roughly the same
magnitude.
One path for future research would be to characterize the full set of agent preferences
where signaling is beneficial. While in this paper we find that signaling mechanisms can im-
prove agent welfare under a broad class of preferences, for some agent preferences signaling
can worsen outcomes. Kushnir (2009) models a high-information setting with minimal con-
gestion where signals disturb firms’ commonly held beliefs about workers preferences, which
in turn disrupts the maximal matching. Kushnir’s example corroborates the intuition that
signals may be more useful in low information settings than in high. Further investigation
of this question could be fruitful.
Another interesting question that is beyond the scope of the current paper concerns the
optimal signaling mechanism. Providing candidates with one, or else a small number of
identical signals offers a tractable approach, and participants may value its simplicity. But
within the realm of mechanisms that offer candidates equal numbers of identical signals, how
do we identify the optimal number of signals, especially in light of the fact that multiple
equilbria may exist? And might we do even better?
If we expand the class of mechanisms under study, we can potentially improve perfor-
mance even more. For example, the signaling mechanism that maximizes the number of
matches may be asymmetric. Consider the example in Section 2, with two firms and two
workers. In the example, each worker had exactly one signal. If both workers have and
send two signals that are identical, outcomes are as if each had no signal. If we offered each
worker two distinct signals, e.g. a ‘gold’ and a ‘silver’ signal, analysis is as if they had one
signal each.
Asymmetric signaling capacities, however, can generate a full matching. Suppose that
one worker has a gold signal, while the other has two silver signals. Suppose further that
firms are indifferent between the two workers. Then one equilibrium involves the first worker
sending its gold signal to its preferred firm. The firm that receives the gold signal will make
the signaling worker an offer, while the firm who receives no gold signal will make an offer
to the worker who sent a silver signal. Both firms and workers will always be matched.
The question of the optimal signaling mechanism, as well as the question of how the
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benefit from signaling varies across market structures, provide interesting areas for future
research.
We wish to highlight that a signaling mechanism has the potential to improve outcomes
in congested markets. Importantly, since signaling mechanisms are free, voluntary, and built
on top of existing labor markets, these improvements come in a reasonably non-invasive
manner. As opposed to a central clearinghouse, as in the National Resident Matching Pro-
gram (c. f. Roth, 1984 and Roth and Peranson, 1999), a centralized signaling mechanism
requires significantly less intervention. Market designers may find it easier to get consensus
from participants to introduce such a mechanism, which nevertheless can offer significant
benefits. As such, we hope that in addition to furthering our understanding of how labor
markets work, our paper adds to the practical literature that aims at changing and improving
existing markets.
A Appendix
A.1 Markets with a single block of firms
This portion of the appendix covers proofs for Sections 3-5. In this setup workers may send
at most one signal, and there is a single block of firms. We omit proofs of Propositions 1
and 2 and Theorem 2 as these are special cases of Propositions A1 and A4 and Theorem 4
respectively.
Proof of Theorem 1. As discussed in Section 4, in any symmetric non-babbling equilibrium
each worker sends its signal to its most preferred firm. Consequently, all information sets
for firms are realized with positive probability, so firm beliefs are determined by Bayes’ Law:
if a firm receives a signal from a worker, it believes that worker ranks the firm first in its
preference list. We now take these worker strategies and firm beliefs as fixed, and analyze
the second stage of the game when firms choose offers. We will show that this reduced game
is a supermodular game, and then use the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to prove
our theorem.
We analyze the game where we restrict firm strategies to be cutoff strategies. Denote
the set of cutoff strategy profiles as Σcut, with typical element σ = (σ1, ..., σF ). Recall that
a cutoff strategy for firm f is a vector σf = (j
1
f , ..., j
W
f ) where j
k
f corresponds to the cutoff
when firm f receives k signals. We will consider only strategies where each cutoff is a natural
number, i.e. jkf ∈ {1, ...,W}. As defined on p.15, vector comparison yields a natural partial
order on Σcut: σ ≥Σcut σ′ ⇔ σf ≥ σ′f ⇔ jkf ≥
(
jkf
)′
for any f ∈ F and k ∈ {1, ...,W}. This
partial order is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
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To show that the second stage is a game with strategic complementarities, we need to
verify that Eθ(pif (σf , σ−f , θ)) is supermodular in σf , and that Eθ(pif (σf , σ−f , θ)) has increas-
ing differences in σf and σ−f . The former is trivially true because when f shifts of one its
cutoff vector components, thisdoes not influence the change in payoff from a shift of another
cutoff vector component. Namely, if we consider σ1f = (..., jl, ..., jk, ...), σ
2
f = (..., j
′
l, ..., jk, ...),
σ3f = (..., jl, ..., j
′
k, ...), and σ
4
f = (..., j
′
l, ..., j
′
k, ...) for some l, k ∈ {1, ...,W} , then
Eθ(pif (σ
1
f , σ−f , θ))− Eθ(pif (σ2f , σ−f , θ)) = Eθ(pif (σ3f , σ−f , θ))− Eθ(pif (σ4f , σ−f , θ)).
That Eθ(pif (σf , σ−f , θ)) has increasing differences in σf and σ−f follows from Proposition
2. Namely, for any σf , σ−f , σ′f , and σ
′
−f such that σ
′
f ≥ σf and σ′−f ≥ σ−f we have
Eθ(pif (σ
′
f , σ
′
−f , θ))− Eθ(pif (σf , σ′−f , θ)) ≥ Eθ(pif (σ′f , σ−f , θ))− Eθ(pif (σf , σ−f , θ)).
Hence the second stage of the game, when firms choose their strategies, is a game with
strategic complementarities. Since in our model firms are ex-ante symmetric, Theorem 5
of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) establishes the existence of largest and smallest symmetric
pure strategy equilibria. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The first two results, increase in the expected number of matches
and positive spillover on workers, are demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 4 in Section 6
(which considers a more general assumption on agent preferences). To avoid repetition, we do
not present the proofs here. However, the third result, that responding to signals generates
a negative spillover on opponent firms, is unique to the case when agent preferences are
uniformly distributed, so we present the proof below.
Let firm f strategy σf differ from σ
′
f in that σ
′
f has weakly greater cutoffs. Consider
some firm f ′ ∈ −f . For each preference list θf ′ and set of signals receivedWS, firm f ′ either
makes an offer to Sf ′(θf ′ ,WS) or Tf ′(θf ′ ,WS). Observe that a change in strategy of firm f
does not affect f ′’s payoff from making Sf ′ an offer. This follows since each worker sends
her signal to her most preferred firm, so offers to signaling workers are always accepted.
However, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the probability that Tf ′ accepts firm f
′’s
offer weakly decreases. Hence, overall the expected payoff of firm f ′ ∈ −f weakly decreases
when firm f responds more to signals: Eθ(pif ′(σf , σ−f , θ)) ≥ Eθ(pif ′(σ′f , σ−f , θ)). 
Proof of Corollary 1. That the expected number of matches and the expected welfare of
workers are higher in the equilibrium with higher cutoffs is a straightforward consequence of
iterated application of the first and the second parts of Proposition 3. In order to show that
firms have lower expected payoffs in the equilibrium with greater cutoffs, we combine the
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third result of Proposition 3 with a simple equilibrium property. Consider two symmetric
equilibria, where firms play cutoff strategies σ and σ′, with σ′ ≥ σ. From the definition
of an equilibrium strategy we have Eθ[pif (σf , σ−f , θ)] ≥ Eθ[pif (σ′f , σ−f , θ)]. The third result
of Proposition 3 yields Eθ[pif (σ
′
f , σ−f , θ)] ≥ Eθ[pif (σ′f , σ′−f , θ)]. Combining these inequalities
yields Eθ[pif (σf , σ−f , θ)] ≥ Eθ[pif (σ′f , σ′−f , θ)]. 
A.2 General block-correlated preferences
This portion of the the appendix covers proofs for Section 6. In this setup workers may
send at most one signal, and worker preferences are block-correlated. We also introduce
Propositions A1-A4 which formalize statements in the text. Proofs for these propositions
are in the web appendix.
Proposition A1 (Equilibrium with no signals). The unique equilibrium of the offer game
with no signals when firms use anonymous strategies and workers accept the best available
offer is σf (θf ) = θ
1
f for all f ∈ F and θf ∈ Θf .
Proposition A2 (Binary nature of optimal firm offer). Suppose firms −f use anonymous
strategies and workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies. Consider a firm f that receives
signals from workers WS ⊂ W. Then the expected payoff to f from making an offer to Sf
is strictly greater than the payoff from making an offer to any other worker in WS . The
expected payoff to firm f from making an offer to Tf is strictly greater than the payoff from
making an offer to any other worker from set W/WS .
Proposition A3 (Optimality of cutoff strategies). Suppose workers use symmetric best-in-
block strategies and firms have best-in-block beliefs. Then for any strategy σf of firm f , there
exists a cutoff strategy that provides f with a weakly higher expected payoff than σf for any
anonymous strategies σ−f of opponent firms −f .
Proposition A4 (Strategic complements under block correlation). Suppose workers play
symmetric best-in-block strategies, and firms −f use cutoff strategies. If firm f ′ ∈ −f
increases its cutoffs (responds more to signals), firm f will also optimally weakly increase its
cutoffs.
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Proof of Proposition 4. We first define an analog of criterion D1 of Cho and Kreps for
our setting.26 Consider some block-symmetric sequential equilibrium. Fix strategies of all
agents except worker w and firm f, which we denote as σ−f,w. Fix also the beliefs of firms
other than firm f , which we denote as µ−f . We now analyze strategies of worker w and
strategies and beliefs for firm f .
There are two cases where information sets for firms might be reached with zero prob-
ability (lie “off the equilibrium path”) in a block-symmetric equilibrium. First, when the
symmetric worker equilibrium strategy prescribes zero probability of sending a signal to a
particular block, firms in these blocks would view signals from such workers as “unexpected.”
Second, when a firm anticipates receiving a signal with 100% probability, then not receiving
a signal would correspond to an off-equilibrium information set. But by the anonymous
strategies assumption, this can only happen in a block-symmetric equilibrium if the firm
is the only one in its block. In this case, the symmetry of worker strategies would ensure
that all workers send their signals to this firm with probability 1. Since signals then would
not transmit information about worker types, this equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a
babbling equilibrium. We will concentrate on the first type of off-equilibrium messages –
“unexpected” signals.
Consider firm f ’s decision at an information set that includes a (hypothetical, off-
equilibrium) signal from worker w. Denote the expected equilibrium payoff of firm f as
u∗f and the expected equilibrium payoff of worker w as u
∗
w. For each possible type θ¯ ∈ Θf for
firm f and each set of signals that firm f could receive, we denote the mixed best response
of firm f that has beliefs µ¯ as
MBRf (θ¯,WS ∪w, µ¯) = arg maxσf∈Σf Eθ−f (pif (σf , σ−f , θ) | θf = θ¯, WSf =WS ∪w, µf = µ¯).
We then denote the mixed best response of firm f for all possible types and all possible
profiles of signals it may receive conditional on receiving worker w’s signal as
MBRf (w, µ¯) = {MBRf (θ¯,WS ∪ w, µ¯) for all θ¯ ∈ Θf , WS ⊂ W}.
We denote the set of best responses of firm f to probability assessments concentrated on set
Ω ⊂ Θw as
MBRf (w,Ω) =
⋃
{µf :µf (Ω)=1}
MBRf (w, µf ).
26See Cho and Kreps (1987) for the original definition.
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Denote for any worker’s type t ∈ Θw
Dt = {φ ∈MBRf (w,Θw) : u∗w(t) < Eθ−w(piw(σw, φ, σ−w,f , θ) | θw = t)}
D0t = {φ ∈MBRf (w,Θw) : u∗w(t) = Eθ−w(piw(σw, φ, σ−w,f , θ) | θw = t)}.
Intuitively, set Dt (D
0
t ) is the set of firm f strategies (consistent with f best responding to
strategies of firms −f and to some set of beliefs that places weight 1 on w signaling f) such
that by signaling f , worker w of type t would receive an expected payoff greater than (equal
to) her equilibrium payoff. We say that type t may be pruned from firm f ’s beliefs if firm
f ’s off-equilibrium beliefs place zero probability on worker w being type t (upon f receiving
a signal from her). Using the above notation, we now state our analog of criterion D1 as
follows:
Criterion D1. Fix strategies of workers −w and strategies and beliefs of firms −f . If for
some type t ∈ Θw of worker w there exists a second type t′ ∈ Θw with Dt ∪D0t ⊆ Dt′ ,
then t may be pruned from the domain of firm f ’s beliefs.
The intuition behind this criterion is that whenever type t of worker w either wishes to
defect and send an off-equilibrium signal to firm f or is indifferent, some other type t′ of
worker w strictly wishes to defect. When we prune t for worker w from firm f ’s beliefs, we
are interpreting that firm f finds it infinitely more likely that the off-equilibrium signal has
come from type t′ than from type t.
We first show that there cannot be a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium that satisfies
Criterion D1 where sending a signal to a firm in some block Fb, b ∈ {1, ..., B} reduces the
likelihood of receiving an offer, i.e. psb < p
ns
b .
Let us assume that such a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium exists. If there are
at least two workers, agents use anonymous block-symmetric strategies, and agents’ types
are uncorrelated, each worker is unmatched with positive probability. Then in equilibrium,
certainly no worker sends her signal to a firm within block Fb; she’d prefer to simply send
no signal at all. Hence, it must be that a signal would reduce the probability of an offer for
firms in some block not signaled in equilibrium. Following the definition of Dt, whenever
it would be beneficial for some type θw ∈ Θw to deviate from the equilibrium path and
send her signal to firm f (which would require firm f making an offer to worker w), then it
would be beneficial for any type θ′w ∈ Θw of worker w such that firm f is w’s most preferred
firm within block Fb, to similarly deviate. Therefore, the only types (preference profiles) of
worker w that are not pruned in firms’ beliefs according to Criterion D1 are those where firm
f is w’s most preferred firm within block Fb. Hence, given these beliefs, if it is optimal for
firm f to make an offer to worker w when it does not receive a signal from her, it is optimal
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for firm f to make an offer to worker w when it receives her signal. This contradicts our
initial assumption, and hence psb0 < p
ns
b0
cannot be part of any block-symmetric sequential
equilibrium that satisfies Criterion D1.
We have established that psb ≥ pnsb for each b = 1, ..., B. It is easy to observe that
there exists a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium that satisfies Criterion D1 where for
any b = 1, ..., B, psb = p
ns
b . For example, each worker may randomize her signal across
all firms with equal probability, independently of her preferences, and firms simply play
the equilibrium strategies of the offer game with no signals. The equilibrium beliefs are
trivially block-uniform since when a firm receives a signal from worker w, its beliefs coincide
with the priors. Since all blocks are reached with positive probability in equilibrium, no
off-equilibrium beliefs need be specified, and the equilibrium trivially satisfies Criterion D1.
Let us now consider the case when there exists b0 ∈ {1, ..., B}, such that psb0 > pnsb0 in
some block-symmetric sequential equilibrium. Recall that the equilibrium probability that
a worker sends her signal to a firm within block Fb is denoted as αb, where αb ∈ [0, 1] and∑B
b=1 αb ≤ 1. Let us consider some block Fb( 6= Fb0) such that αb > 0. As mentioned, if
there are at least two workers, agents use anonymous block-symmetric strategies, and agents’
types are uncorrelated, each worker is unmatched with positive probability in equilibrium.
Therefore, αb > 0 and p
s
b = p
ns
b are incompatible in an equilibrium (worker w can benefit by
signaling to block Fb0 rather than block Fb). Hence, if psb > pnsb then if worker w plans to
send a signal to a firm in Fb, it should be to her most preferred firm within this block, as
this delivers the greatest expected payoff to her.
Now suppose there is some block Fb′ , b′ ∈ {1, ..., B}, such that αb′ = 0. Consider the
decision of some firm f ∈ Fb′ at an information set that includes a (hypothetical, off-
equilibrium) signal from worker w. We have two cases: either there exists type t ∈ Θw of
worker w such that Dt 6= ∅, or else for any type t ∈ Θw, Dt = ∅.
We will first rule out the former case. Suppose there exists type t ∈ Θw of worker w such
that Dt 6= ∅. That is, if worker w sends a signal to firm f , there exists a “reasonable” firm
f strategy that delivers expected payoff to worker w of type t greater than her equilibrium
payoff. However, any firm f offer that delivers payoff exceeding equilibrium payoff for worker
w of type t, also delivers payoff exceeding equilibrium payoff for a worker w of type t′ which
prefers firm f to any other firm in block Fb′ . Therefore, the only firm f off-equilibrium
beliefs that survive Criterion D1 are such that
µf ({θw ∈ Θw : f = max
θw
(f ′ ∈ Fb′)} |w ⊂ WSf ) = 1. (A.2.1)
But since Dt′ and D
0
t′ consist of firm f best responses, it is optimal for firm f to indeed make
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an offer to worker w upon receiving her signal, provided f ’s beliefs are restricted to (A.2.1).
This means that the equilibrium strategy of worker w of type t′ (not sending a signal to firm
f) is not optimal if firm f has beliefs (A.2.1). Therefore, there cannot exist type t ∈ Θw of
worker w such that Dt 6= ∅.
Let us now consider the case where for any type t ∈ Θw , we have Dt = ∅. That is, it
is never beneficial for any type of worker to send an off-equilibrium signal, as no reasonable
offers can be expected for any firm beliefs. Therefore, αb′ = 0 is an equilibrium strategy
for worker w independently of off-equilibrium beliefs of firm f . In particular, worker w’s
strategy is optimal for any off-equilibrium beliefs of firms in block Fb′ , even if each firm f
has the most favorable possible beliefs about worker w, such as in (A.2.1).
Note that if there are at least two workers, the interaction between worker w and some
firm f (fixing the strategies and beliefs of other agents) is a monotonic signaling game of Cho
and Sobel (1990). The assumption of monotonicity is satisfied in our environment because
each type of worker w prefers the same action of firm f , i.e. firm f making an offer to worker
w. As a consequence, Criterion D1 is equivalent to “never a weak best response” of Cho
and Kreps (1987) and “universal divinity” of Banks and Sobel (1987) in our setting. More
detailed discussion of monotonic signaling games can be found in Cho and Sobel (1990). 
Proof of Theorem 3. We first prove the theorem while requiring firms to use cutoff
strategies and workers to use best-in-block strategies, and then show that this assumption
is not restrictive. Denote a typical such strategy profile as σ = (σF , σW ) that consists
of firm cutoff strategies σF = (σf1 , ..., σfF ) and worker best-in-block strategies strategies
σW = (σw1 , ..., σwW ).
A strategy of firm f is a vector of real numbers of size W that specifies cutoff points
for each positive number of signals firm f could receive, σf = (j
1
f , ..., j
W
f ), where j
l
f is a real
number from the interval [1,W ] for each l = 1, ...,W . Denote the set of possible firm cutoff
strategies as Σcutf = [1,W ]
W .
A best-in-block strategy of worker w is a vector of size B that specifies the probability
that she sends her signal to her top firm of specific block σw = (α
1
w, ..., α
B
w), where α
b
w ≥ 0
for each b = 1, ..., B and
∑B
b=1 α
b
w ≤ 1. We denote the set of possible worker best-in-block
strategies as Σblockw = {(α1, ..., αB) : αb ≥ 0 and
∑B
b=1 α
b ≤ 1}.
Let us also denote the expected payoff of worker w when she uses best-in-block strategy
σw and the other agents use strategy σ−w as27
Uw(σw, σ−w) = Eθ(piw(σw, σ−w, θ))
27Note that the strategy of agents are anonymous. Therefore, they do not depend on particular realization
of preferences.
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and the expected payoff of firm f when it uses strategy σf and the other agents use strategies
σ−f as
Uf (σf , σ−f ) = Eθ(pif (σf , σ−f , θ)).
We introduce best reply correspondence g : (Σcutf )
F × (Σblockw )W → 2(Σ
cut
f )
F×(Σblockw )W such that
gf (σ) = arg maxβ∈Σcutf Uw(β, σ−w)
for each f ∈ F and
gw(σ) = arg maxβ∈Σblockw Ua(β, σ−w)
for each w ∈ W .
An immediate consequence of the above definitions is that Σcutf and Σ
block
w are non-empty,
convex, and compact. Also, Uw(σw, σ−w) is a linear function of its first argument. Namely,
let us denote the expected payoff of worker w from sending a signal to some block Fb given
the strategies of agents σ−w as Πb(−σw). If worker w employs strategy σw = (α1w, ..., αBw),
her payoff equals
Uw(σw, σ−w) =
∑B
b=1
αbΠb(−σw).
Therefore, gw(σ) is a continuous correspondence with closed graph.
Let us now consider function Uf (σf , σ−f ). Similarly, let us consider some realized pref-
erence profile θ when firm f receives
∣∣WS∣∣ signals. Given the strategies σ−f of other agents,
we denote the expected payoff of firm f from making an offer to Tf as ΠT , and the expected
payoff of firm f from making an offer to Sf as ΠS. We then evaluate the payoff for firm f
from using cutoff strategy j|WS |, σf = (..., j|WS |, ...) as
pif (σf , σ−f , θ) =

ΠT if j|WS | ≤ rank(Sf )− 1
(dj|WS |e − j|WS |)ΠS + (j|WS | − bj|WS |c)ΠT if j|WS | ∈ (rank(Sf )− 1, rank(Sf ))
ΠS if j|WS | ≥ rank(Sf )
where dj|WS |e and bj|WS |c denote the closest integer larger and smaller than j|WS | correspondingly.
Function pif (σf , σ−f , θ) is a quasi-concave function of cutoff j|WS |. Therefore, the ex-
pected payoff from using cutoff j|WS |, Eθ[pif (σf , σ−f , θ)||WSf | = |WS|], is also a quasi-concave
function of cutoff j|WS | as it is a linear combination of quasi-concave functions. Therefore,
Uf (σf , σ−f ) is a quasi-concave function of its first argument. It follows that gf (σ) is a con-
tinuous correspondence with closed graph.
Since g(σ) is a continuous correspondence with closed graph, g(σ) has a fixed point by
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Kakutani’s theorem (see Kakutani, 1941).
Until now we have required cutoff strategies for firms. However, Proposition 4 and Propo-
sition A3 allow us to conclude that the above equilibrium is also an equilibrium when we
allow any deviations, not simply deviations in cutoff strategies. Hence, we have established
the existence of an equilibrium when workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies and
firms use symmetric cutoff strategies and have best-in-block beliefs. 
Proof of Theorem 4. We will use following lemma, proved in the web appendix.
Lemma A1 (Incremental welfare). Assume firms use cutoff strategies and workers use
best-in-block strategies. Fix the strategies of firms −f as σ−f . Let firm f ’s strategy σf
differ from σ′f only in that σ
′
f has greater cutoffs (more response more to signals). Then
Eθ(m(σ
′
f , σ−f , θ)) ≥ Eθ(m(σf , σ−f , θ)) and Eθ(piw(σ′f , σ−f , θ)) ≥ Eθ(piw(σf , σ−f , θ)).
Let us denote firm strategies in the unique equilibrium of the offer game with no signals
as σ0F . Now consider a block-symmetric equilibrium of the offer game with signals when
agent use strategies (σF , σW ). If agents employ strategies (σ
0
F , σW ), the expected number of
matches and the welfare of workers equal the corresponding parameters in the offer game
with no signals. Therefore, the result that the expected number of matches and the expected
welfare of workers in a block-symmetric equilibrium in the offer game with signals are weakly
greater than the corresponding parameters in the unique equilibrium of the offer game with
no signals is a consequence of sequential application of Lemma A1.
Let us now consider a non-babbling block-symmetric equilibrium (σF , σW ) of the offer
game with signals such that there exists block Fb with at least two firms where αb > 0.
Proposition 4 shows that firms from block Fb respond to signals in the equilibrium, i.e.
make offers to signaling workers with positive probability, so that psb > p
ns
b .
Select some firm f from block Fb. Using a construction similar to that in the proof of
Lemma A1 we consider two sets of preference profiles:
Θ¯+ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | m(σ0f , σ−f , θ) < m(σf , σ−f , θ)}
Θ¯− ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | m(σ0f , σ−f , θ) > m(σf , σ−f , θ)}.
Consider some realized profile of preferences, θ ∈ Θ, and denote Tf = w′ and Sf = w. Define
mapping ψ : Θ → Θ so that ψ(θ) is the profile in which workers have preferences as in
θ, but firms −f all swap the positions of workers w′ and w in their preference lists. Note
that ψ(ψ(θ)) = θ and ψ is a bijection on Θ. A direct consequence of Lemma A1 is that
|Θ¯+| ≥ |Θ¯−|. Let us now show that there exist θ ∈ Θ¯+ such that ψ(θ) /∈ Θ¯−.
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There are at least two firms, f and f ′, in block Fb that respond to signals. Consider some
profile θ from Θ¯+. We again denote Tf = w
′ and Sf = w. Therefore, worker w does not
have an offer from any other firm for profile θ from Θ¯+, but worker w
′ has at least two offers.
Since worker w′ sends her signal to firm f ′ with positive probability and firm f ′ responds to
signals, i.e. makes offers to its top signaling workers, there exist θ∗ ∈ Θ¯+ such that worker
w′ is the top signaling worker of firm f ′, and firm f ′ makes an offer to worker w′.
However, worker w for profile ψ(θ∗) does not have any other offer, because she is neither
Tf nor Sf for profile ψ(θ
∗). Therefore, ψ(θ∗) cannot belong to Θ¯−. Therefore, we have found
a profile from Θ¯+ that does not belong to Θ¯−. As a result, |Θ¯+| > |Θ¯−| and we have that
Eθ[m(σ
0
f , σ−f , θ)] < Eθ[m(σf , σ−f , θ)].
In addition, we know that
Eθ[m(σ
0
f , σ
0
−f , θ)] ≤ Eθ[m(σ0f , σ−f , θ)],
which gives us
Eθ[m(σ
0
f , σ
0
−f , θ)] < Eθ[m(σf , σ−f , θ)].
Overall, the expected number of matches in the offer game with signals when agents use
strategies (σF , σW ) is strictly greater than the expected number of matches in the offer game
with no signals.
Using the above construction and the logic of the proof of Lemma A1 we obtain the
result for worker welfare. The example presented in Section 2 illustrates that signals can
ambiguously influence the welfare of firms. Specifically, Table 2 shows that firm welfare
increases upon introduction of a signaling mechanism only if the value of a second ranked
worker is sufficiently high, in this case when x > 0.5. 
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*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
B Web Appendix: Proofs and extensions.
B.1 Proofs of results about block correlated markets.
This subsection provides proofs for Propositions A1, A2, A3 and A4, and the proof of Lemma
A1.
Proof of Proposition A1 (Equilibrium with no signals). Consider some agent preference
profile θ ∈ Θ. We will compare two strategies for firm f given its profile of preferences θf :
strategy σf of making an offer to its top worker, and strategy σ
′
f of making an offer to its
nth ranked worker, n > 1. We have σf (θ) = θ
1
f ≡ w and σ′f (θ) = θnf ≡ wn. We will show that
for any anonymous strategies σ−f of opponent firms −f , these two strategies yield identical
probabilities of f being matched, so that f optimally makes its offer to its most preferred
worker. The proposition straightforwardly follows.
Denote a permutation that changes the ranks of w and wn in a firm preference list (or
profile of firm preference lists) as
ρ : (..., w, ..., wn, ...) −→ (..., wn, ..., w, ...).
We now construct preference profile θ′ ∈ Θ from θ as follows:
• firm f preferences are the same as in θ : θ′f = θf ,
• workers w and wn are exchanged in the preference lists of firms −f : ∀f ′ ∈ −f, we
have θ′f ′ = ρ(θf ′)
• worker w and worker wn preference profiles are exchanged: θ′w = θwn , θ′wn = θw, and
• θw′ = θ′w′ for any other w′ ∈ W \{w,wn}.
Define function mf : (Σw)
W × (Σf )F ×Θ→ R as the probability of firm f being matched as
a function of agent strategies and types. Since firm −f strategies are anonymous we have
σ−f (θ′−f ) = σ−f (ρ(θ−f )) = ρ (σ−f (θ−f ))
Therefore, the probability of firm f ′, f ′ ∈ −f, making an offer to worker w for profile θ
equals the probability of making an offer to worker wn for profile θ′. Moreover, since we
exchange worker w and wn preference lists for profile θ′, whenever it is optimal for worker
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w to accept firm f offer for profile θ, it is optimal for worker wn to accept firm f ′s offer for
profile θ′. Therefore,
mf (σf , σ−f , θ) = mf (σ′f , σ−f , θ
′)
In other words, given θf , for each θ−f there exists θ′−f such that the probability of f ’s
offer to θ1f being accepted when opponent preferences are θ−f equals the probability of f ’s
offer to θnf being accepted when opponent preferences are θ
′
−f .
28 Moreover θ′−f is different
for different θ−f by construction. Since θ−f and θ′−f are equally likely, we have
Eθ−fmf (σf , σ−f , θ | θf ) = Eθ−fmf (σ′f , σ−f , θ | θf )
and
Eθmf (σf , σ−f , θ) = Eθmf (σ′f , σ−f , θ).
That is, the expected probability of getting a match from firm f ’s top choice equals the
expected probability of getting a match from firm f ’s nth ranked choice. Since the utility
from obtaining a top match is greater, the strategy of firm f of making an offer to its top
worker is optimal. 
Proof of Proposition A2 (Binary nature of firm optimal offer). Consider firm f from
some block Fb, b ∈ {1, ..., B} that has realized preference profile θ∗ ∈ Θf and that receives
signals from the set of workers WS ⊂ W . Denote worker Sf as w and select arbitrary other
worker w′ ∈ WS . We first prove that the expected payoff to f from making an offer to
worker w is strictly greater than the expected payoff from making an offer to worker w′.
We denote the strategies of firm f that correspond to these actions as σf (θ
∗,WS) = w and
σ′f (θ
∗,WS) = w′.
Workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies and firms have best-in-block beliefs.
Specifically, firm f believes that it is the top firm within block Fb in the preference lists
of workers w and w′. Denote the set of all possible agents’ profiles consistent with firm f
beliefs as29
Θ¯ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | θf = θ∗ and f = max
θw
(f ′ ∈ Fb′) for each w ∈ WS}
28In this context, θ−f is a preference profile for all agents – both workers and firms – other than f .
29For the case of one block of firms, firm f beliefs also exclude preference profiles where firm f is a top
firm for those workers that did not send signal to firm f.
Θ¯ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | θf = θ∗, f = max
θw
(f ′ ∈ Fb′) for each w ∈ WS , and f 6= maxθw(f ′ ∈ Fb′) for each w ∈ W\WS}.
For simplicity, we assume that there are at least two blocks. All the derivations are also valid without change
for the case of one block.
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As in the proof of Proposition A1, we denote a permutation that changes the ranks of w
and w′ in a firm preference list (or profile of firm preference lists) as
ρ : (..., w, ...w′, ...)→ (..., w′, ...w, ...).
We now construct preference profile θ′ ∈ Θ from θ∗ as follows:
• firm f preferences are the same as in θ∗: θ′f = θ∗,
• workers w and w′ are exchanged in the preference lists of firms −f : ∀f ′ ∈ −f, we
have θ′f ′ = ρ(θf ′),
• worker w and worker w′ preference profiles are exchanged θ′w = θw′ , θ′w′ = θw, and
• for any other w0 ∈ W\{w,w′}, θw0 = θ′w0 .
Since firm f ’s preference list is unchanged and since w,w′∈ WS , profile θ′ belongs to Θ¯.
Since strategies of firms −f are anonymous, then for any f ′ ∈ −f and for any WS
f ′ ⊂ W we
have
σf ′(ρ(θf ′), ρ(WSf ′)) = ρ
(
σf ′(θf ′ ,WSf ′)
)
.
Worker w and w′ send their signals to firm f under both profile θ and θ′. Therefore, they
do not send their signals to firms −f , i.e. ρ(WS
f ′) =W
S
f ′ . Since θ
′
f = ρ(θf ) we have
σf ′(θ
′
f ′ ,WSf ′) = ρ
(
σf ′(θf ′ ,WSf ′)
)
.
This means that the probability of firm f ′ making an offer to worker w for profile θ equals
the probability of making an offer to worker w′ for profile θ′. Moreover, since we exchange
worker w and w′ preference lists for profile θ′, whenever it is optimal for worker w to accept
firm f ′s offer under profile θ, it is optimal for worker w′ to accept an offer from firm f ′ under
profile θ′. Since firm types are independent, the probability of firm f being matched when
it uses strategy σf for profile θ equals the probability of firm f being matched when it uses
strategy σ′f for profile θ
′ :
mf (σf , σ−f , θ) = mf (σ′f , σ−f , θ
′).
Therefore, for each θ ∈ Θ¯ there exists θ′ ∈ Θ¯ such that the probability that firm f
gets an offer from worker w equals the probability that firm f gets an offer from worker w′.
Moreover, profile θ′ is different for different θ by our construction. Since θ and θ′ are equally
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likely,
Eθmf (σf , σ−f , θ | θ ∈ Θ¯) = Eθmf (σ′f , σ−f , θ | θ ∈ Θ¯).
Therefore, the expected probability that firm f gets a match if it makes an offer to some
worker in WS is the same across all workers in WS. But within this set, a match with Sf
offers the greatest utility, so the expected payoff to f from making an offer to Sf is strictly
greater than the payoff from making an offer to any other worker in WS.
A similar construction is valid for the workers in set W\WS. That is, the probability
that firm f ’s offer is accepted is the same across all workers inW\WS. Hence, firm f prefers
making an offer to its most valuable worker, Tf , than to any other worker in W\WS.30 
Proof of Proposition A3 (Optimality of Cutoff Strategies). If workers use best-in-block
strategies and firms have best-in-block beliefs, the optimal choice of firm f for each set of
received signals is either Sf or Tf (or some lottery between them) (see Proposition A2). In
light of this, we break the proof into two parts. First we show that the identities of workers
that have sent a signal to firm f influence neither the expected payoff of making an offer
to Sf nor the expected payoff of making an offer to Tf , conditional on the total number of
signals received by f remaining constant. Second we prove that if it is optimal for firm f
to choose Sf when it receives signals from some set of workers, then it still optimal for firm
f to choose Sf if the number of received signals does not change and Sf has a smaller rank
(Sf is more valuable to f).
Let us consider some firm f from block Fb, b ∈ {1, ..., B} and some realization θ∗ of its
preference list. Assume that it is optimal for firm f to make an offer to Sf if it receives a
set of signals WS ⊂ W . We want to show that if firm f receives the set of signals WS′ such
that Sf (θ
∗,WS) = Sf (θ∗,WS′) and
∣∣WS′∣∣ = ∣∣WS∣∣, it is still optimal for firm f to make an
offer to Sf . For simplicity, we only consider the case when WS and WS′ differ only in one
signal. (The general case then follows straightforwardly.) That is, there exist worker w and
worker w′ such that w belongs to set WS, but not to set WS′ ; while w′ belongs to WS′ , but
not to WS. We consider two firm f strategies for realization of signals WS and WS′ .
σf (θ
∗, ·) = Sf (θ∗, ·)
σ′f (θ
∗, ·) = Tf (θ∗, ·).
We denote the set of possible agents’ profiles that are consistent with firm f having received
30It is certainly possible that Tf = Sf . In this case the statement of the proposition is still valid. Firm f
believes that it is Tf ’s top firm within block Fb and firm f prefers making an offer to Tf = Sf rather than
to any other worker in W.
43
signals from WS and WS′ as31
Θ¯S ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | θf = θ∗ and f = max
θw
(f ′ ∈ Fb′) for each w ∈ WS}
Θ¯S
′ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | θf = θ∗ and f = max
θw
(f ′ ∈ Fb′) for each w ∈ WS′}
correspondingly. We now construct a bijection between Θ¯S and Θ¯S
′
. Denote a permutation
that changes the ranks of w and w′ in a firm preference profile as
ρ : (..., w, ...w′, ...) −→ (..., w′, ...w, ...).
For any profile θ ∈ Θ¯S we construct profile θ′ ∈ Θ as follows:
• firm f preferences are the same as in θ: θ′f = θ∗,
• the ranks of workers w and w′ are exchanged in the preference lists of firms −f :
∀f ′ ∈ −f, θ′f = ρ(θf ),
• the preference lists of worker w and worker w′ are exchanged: θ′w = θw′ , θ′w′ = θw, and
• for any other w0 ∈ W\{w,w′}, θw0 = θ′w0 .
Since this construction leaves the preference list of firm f unchanged, and since workers w
and w′ swap preference lists, we have that if θ ∈ Θ¯S, then θ′ ∈ Θ¯S′ . By construction, profile
θ′ is different for different θ. Finally, since the cardinality of sets Θ¯S and Θ¯S
′
are the same,
the above correspondence is a bijection.
Since firm −f strategies are anonymous, for any f ′ ∈ −f and WSf ′ ⊂ W
σf ′(ρ(θf ′), ρ(WSf ′)) = ρ
(
σf ′(θf ′ ,WSf ′)
)
.
This means that the probability of firm f ′ making an offer to worker w for any profile θ
equals the probability of firm f ′ making an offer to worker w′ for corresponding profile θ′.
Moreover, since we exchange worker w and w′ preference lists for profile θ′, whenever it is
optimal for worker w to accept firm f offer for profile θ, it is optimal for worker w′ to accept
firm f ′s offer for profile θ′. Since firms types are independent, the probability of firm f being
matched when it uses strategy σf (θ
∗, ·) for profile θ equals the probability of firm f being
matched when it uses strategy σf (θ
∗, ·) for profile θ′:
mf (σf , σ−f , θ) = mf (σf , σ−f , θ′).
31See footnote 29 for the definition of firm beliefs for the case of one block.
44
Similarly, for strategy σ′f (θ
∗, ·) we have
mf (σ
′
f , σ−f , θ) = mf (σ
′
f , σ−f , θ
′).
Since our construction is a bijection between Θ¯S and Θ¯S
′
, and since θ and θ′ are equally
likely, we have
Eθmf (σf , σ−f , θ | θ ∈ Θ¯S) = Eθmf (σf , σ−f , θ′ | θ′ ∈ Θ¯S′)
Eθmf (σ
′
f , σ−f , θ | θ ∈ Θ¯S) = Eθmf (σ′f , σ−f , θ′ | θ′ ∈ Θ¯S
′
).
Therefore, if firm f optimally makes an offer to Sf (Tf ) when it has received set of signals
WS, it also should optimally make an offer to Sf (Tf ), which is the same worker, for the set
of signals WS′ .
We now prove that if firm f optimally chooses Sf (θ
∗,WS) when it receives signals from
WS, then it should still optimally choose Sf (θ∗,WS′) for set of signalsWS′ , if the number of
received signals is the same
∣∣WS′∣∣ = ∣∣WS∣∣ and Sf (θ∗,WS′) has a smaller rank, that is, when
the signaling worker is more valuable to f . We consider set WS′ that differs from WS only
in the best (for firm f) worker and the difference between the ranks of top signaled workers
equals one. (The general case follows straightforwardly.) That is,
w ∈ WS/Sf (θ∗,WS)⇔ w ∈ WS′/Sf (θ∗,WS′) and
rankf (Sf (θ
∗,WS′)) = rankf (Sf (θ∗,WS))− 1.
The construction in the first part of the proof works again in this case. Using sets of
profiles and a correspondence similar to the one above, we can show that the probabilities
of firm f being matched with Sf (Tf ) are the same for WS and WS′ . Observe that if firm
f ’s offer to Tf is accepted, naturally firm f gets the same payoff for sets WS and WS′ . If
firm f ’s offer to Sf is accepted, firm f gets strictly greater payoff for set WS′ compared to
set WS, because by definition Sf (θ∗,WS′) has smaller rank than Sf (θ∗,WS). Hence, if it is
optimal for firm f to make an offer to Sf (θ
∗,WS) when it receives set of signals WS, it is
optimal for firm f to make an offer to Sf (θ
∗,WS′) when firm f receives set of signals WS′ .
Combined, the two statements we have just proved allow us to conclude that if firms
−f use anonymous strategies, firm f ’s optimal strategy can be represented as some cutoff
strategy.32 
32Note that there can be other optimal strategies. If firm f is indifferent between making an offer to Sf
and making an offer to Tf for some set of signals, firm f could optimally make its offer to Sf or to Tf
for any set of signals conditional on maintaining the same rank of the most preferred signaling worker and
cardinality of signals received.
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Proof of Proposition A4 (Strategic complements under block correlation). Consider some
firm f from some block Fb, b ∈ {1, ..., B}. We consider two strategy profiles, σ−f and σ′−f ,
for firms −f that vary only in the strategy for firm f ′ . For simplicity, we assume that σ′f ′
differs from σf ′ only for some profile θ¯f ′ and some set of received signals WSf ′
σf ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = αSf ′ + (1− α)Tf ′
σ′f ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = α′Sf ′ + (1− α′)Tf ′
such that α′ > α. Formally, this means σ′f is not a cutoff strategy, because a cutoff strategy
requires the same behavior for any profile of preferences (anonymity) when firms receive
the same number of signals. We will prove the statement using our simplifying assumption
about strategies for firms −f , and the extension to the full proposition follows from iterated
application of this result.
Consider some realized firm f preference profile θ∗f ∈ Θ and some set of signalsWS ⊂ W .
We want to show that firm f ’s payoff from making an offer to Tf (weakly) decreases whereas
firm f ’s payoff from making an offer to Sf (weakly) increases when firm f
′ responds more
to signals, i.e. plays strategy σ′f ′ instead of σf ′ . That is,
I) Eθ(pif (Tf , σ−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≥ Eθ(pif (Tf , σ′−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS)
II) Eθ(pif (Sf , σ−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≤ Eθ(pif (Sf , σ′−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS).
Since firm f ’s offer can only be either accepted or declined, the above statements are equiv-
alent to
I) Eθ(mf (Tf , σ−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≥ Eθ(mf (Tf , σ′−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS)
II) Eθ(mf (Sf , σ−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≤ Eθ(mf (Sf , σ′−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS).
That is, we wish to show that the probability of being matched to Tf weakly decreases, and
the probability of being matched to Sf weakly increases.
We first prove I) first. Define the sets of agent profiles that lead to the increase and
decrease in the probability of getting a match given the change in firm f ′ strategy as
Θ¯+ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS and mf (Tf , σ−f , θ) < mf (Tf , σ′−f , θ)}
Θ¯− ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS and mf (Tf , σ−f , θ) > mf (Tf , σ′−f , θ)}
correspondingly. If set Θ¯+ is empty, the statement has been proved. Otherwise, select
arbitrary θ ∈ Θ¯+ and denote Tf ≡ w. Since in this case, f ′’s strategy change pivotally reduces
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competition to f ’s offer to w, we must have Tf ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = w and Sf ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = w′ 6= w,
and
σf ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = αw′ + (1− α)w
σ′f ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = α′w′ + (1− α′)w.
Note that it cannot be that firm f is from a higher ranked block than firm f ′ , i.e. f ′ ∈ Fb′
where b′ > b. If f were from a higher ranked block, an offer from firm f ′ is always worse
than the offer of firm f and could not influence the probability that firm f obtains a match.
Therefore, firm f is from a block that is weakly worse than Fb′ , i.e. b′ ≤ b.
Note that under θ, worker w has sent a signal neither to firm f nor to firm f ′. This will
allow us to construct element θ′ ∈ Θ¯−. Consider a permutation that changes the ranks of w
and w′ in a firm preference profile
ρ : (..., w, ...w′, ...) −→ (..., w′, ...w, ...).
For any profile θ ∈ Θ¯+ we construct profile θ′ ∈ Θ as follows:
• θ′f = θ∗f
• the ranks of workers w and w′ are exchanged in the preference lists of firms −f : for
each firm f ′ ∈ −f, θ′f ′ = ρ(θf ′)
• worker w and worker w′ preference profiles are exchanged: θ′w = θw′ , θ′w′ = θw, and
• for any other w0 ∈ W\{w,w′}, θw0 = θ′w0 .
Note that under θ and θ′, firm f has the same preferences θ∗f and receives the same set of
signals.
Since firm strategies are anonymous we have that
σf ′(θ
′
f ′ ,WS
′
f ′ ) = σf ′(ρ(θf ′), ρ(WSf ′)) (by our construction)
= αρ(w′) + (1− α)ρ(w) (by anonymity)
= αw + (1− α)w′
and similarly
σ′f ′(θ
′
f ′ ,WS
′
f ′ ) = α
′w + (1− α′)w′.
We will now argue that θ′ ∈ Θ¯−. Since θ ∈ Θ¯+, the strategy change for firm f ′ reduces
the likelihood of firm f being matched with worker w (when f makes Tf an offer under
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profile θ). Under profile θ′, firm f ′ makes an offer to worker w more frequently when using
strategy σ′f ′ rather than σf ′ . Furthermore, worker w prefers firm f
′ to firm f under profile
θ′. (We have already shown that f ′ cannot be in a lower ranked block than f . If firm f ′ is
in a higher ranked block Fb′ , b > b′, worker w always prefers firm f ′ to firm f . If firm f and
firm f ′ are from the same block, b = b′, worker w prefers f to f ′, since worker w sends a
signal to firm f ′ under profile θ′).
To finish our proof, we must also investigate the behavior of a firm that receives worker
w’s signal for profile θ, say firm fy. If firm fy makes an offer to worker w for profile θ, since
the change of firm f ′ strategy changes firm f ’s payoff, firm fy must be lower ranked than
both firms f and f ′ in worker w’s preferences. Hence, firm fy’s offer cannot change the
action of worker w. If worker w′ sends her signal to firm fy then firm fy either makes an
offer to worker w′ or to worker Tfy , which are both different from worker w.
Hence, firm fy does not influence the behavior of the agents in question, and the overall
probability that firm f ’s offer to worker w is accepted is smaller when firm f ′ uses strategy
σ′f ′ rather than σf ′ . That is, θ
′ ∈ Θ¯−.
Note that the above construction gives different profiles in Θ¯+ for different profiles of Θ¯−.
Hence, our construction is an injective function from Θ¯+ to Θ¯−, so
∣∣Θ¯−∣∣ > ∣∣Θ¯+∣∣.33 Since
profiles θ and θ′ are equally likely, we have
Eθ(mf (Tf , σ−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≥ Eθ(mf (Tf , σ′−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS).
We now prove inequality II). That is, we will show that if firm f ′ responds more to
signals, the probability of firm f being matched to Sf (upon making Sf an offer) weakly
increases. If firm f, f ∈ Fb, receives a signal from worker w it believes it is the best firm in
block Fb according to worker w’s preferences. That is, worker w prefers the offer of firm f
to an offer from any other firm f ′ from any block Fb′ with b′ ≥ b. Therefore, the change of
the behavior of any firm f ′ from block Fb′ , b′ ≥ b, does not influence firm f ’s payoff.
If we consider some firm f ′ from group Fb′ , b′ < b, it can draw away worker w’s offer
from firm f only if it makes an offer to worker w. However, firm f ′ makes an offer to worker
w, conditionally on firm f receiving a signal from worker w, only when worker w is Tf ′ .
However, if firm f ′ responds more to signals, it makes an offer to its Tf more rarely. This
means that firm f ′ draws worker w away from firm f less often. Therefore, the probability
that firm f ’s offer is accepted by Sf increases:
Eθ(mf (Sf , σ−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≤ Eθ(mf (Sf , σ′−f , θ) | θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS).
33One may show by example that this is not, in general, a bijection.
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As a corollary of I) and II), if firm f ′ increases its cutoff point for some set of signals,
firm f will also optimally (weakly) increase its cutoff points. The above logic is valid for the
change of cutoff points for any set of signals of the same size and any profile of preferences,
so the statement of the proposition immediately follows. 
Proof of Lemma A1. We prove the first statement first. Let us consider firm f cutoff
strategies σf and σ
′
f such that σ
′
f has weakly greater cutoffs. We consider two sets of
preference profiles
Θ¯+ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | m(σf , σ−f , θ) < m(σ′f , σ−f , θ)}
Θ¯− ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | m(σf , σ−f , θ) > m(σ′f , σ−f , θ)}.
For each profile θ from set Θ+, it must be the case that without firm f ’s offer, Tf has an
offer from another firm and worker Sf does not:
m(σ′f , σ−f , θ)−m(σf , σ−f , θ) = 1. (B.1.1)
Similarly, if profile θ is from set Θ−, it must be the case that without firm f offer, Sf has
an offer from another firm, and Tf does not
m(σ′f , σ−f , θ)−m(σf , σ−f , θ) = −1. (B.1.2)
We will now show that |Θ¯+| ≥ |Θ¯−|. Equations (B.1.1) and (B.1.2), along with the fact
that each θ ∈ Θ+ ∪Θ− occurs equally likely, will then be enough to prove the result.
Let us denote Tf = w
′ and Sf = w. We construct function ψ : Θ → Θ as follows. Let
ψ(θ) be the profile in which workers have preferences as in θ, but firms −f all swap the
positions of workers w′ and w in their preference lists. If profile θ belongs to Θ¯−, without
firm f ’s offer, worker w has an offer from another firm, and worker w′ does not. Therefore,
when preferences are ψ(θ), without firm f ’s offer the following two statements must be true:
i) worker w′ must have another offer and ii) worker w cannot have another offer.
To see i), note that under θ, worker w sends a signal to firm f , so his outside offer must
come from some firm f ′ who has ranked him first. Under profile ψ(θ), firm f ′ ranks worker
w′ first. If worker w′ has not sent a signal to firm f ′, then by anonymity, w′ gets the offer of
firm f ′. If worker w′ has signaled to firm f ′, worker w′ again gets firm f ′’s offer.
To see ii), suppose to the contrary that under ψ(θ), worker w does in fact receive an offer
from some firm f ′ 6= f . Since worker w sends a signal to firm f , worker w must be Tf ′ under
ψ(θ), so that worker w′ is Tf ′ under θ. But then by anonymity w′ receives the offer of firm
f ′ under θ, a contradiction.
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From i) and ii), we have
θ ∈ Θ¯− ⇒ ψ(θ) ∈ Θ¯+.
Since function ψ is injective, we have |Θ¯+| ≥ |Θ¯−|.
In order to prove the second statement note that the expected number of matches of each
worker increases when firm f responds more to signals. Using the construction presented
above, one can show that whenever worker w “loses” a match with firm f for profile θ
(worker w is Tf ) it is possible to construct profile θ
′ when worker w obtains a match (worker
w is Sf ). The function that matches these profiles is again injective. Moreover, worker w
values more greatly the match with firm f when she has signaled it (Sf ) rather when she is
simply highest ranked (Tf ). Therefore, the ex-ante utility of worker w increases when firm
f responds more to signals. 
B.2 Market Structure and the Value of a Signaling Mechanism —
Proofs and Extensions
This set of results pertains to Section 7: Market Structure and the Value of a Signaling
Mechanism. In this section, we denote as u(j) the utility of a firm from matching with its
jth ranked worker.
Proposition B1. Under the assumption that
u(W ) > W
F
(
1− (1− 1
W
)F)
u(1) (B.2.1)
there is a unique non-babbling equilibrium in the offer game with signals. Each worker sends
her signal to her top firm. Each firm f makes an offer to Sf if it receives at least one signal;
otherwise, firm f makes an offer to Tf .
Proof. We will show that under condition (B.2.1) even if Sf is the worst ranked worker
in firm f preferences, firm f still optimally makes her an offer.
Proposition 2 shows that if firms −f respond more to signals, i.e. increase their cutoffs, it
is also optimal for firm f to respond more to signals. Therefore, if firm f optimally responds
to signals when no other firm does, it will certainly optimally respond to signals when other
firm respond. Hence, it will be enough to consider the incentives of firm f when firms −f
do not respond to signals and always make an offer their top ranked workers.
Let us consider some realized profile of preferences of firm f and denote Tf as w. If firms
−f do not respond to signals, then some firm among −f makes an offer to worker w with
probability q = 1
W
. Therefore, the probability that the offer of firm f to worker w is accepted
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equals
(1− q)F−1 + ...+ CjF−1qj (1− q)F−1−j 1j+1 + ...+ qF−1 1F (B.2.2)
where Cyx =
x!
y!(x−y)! . Intuitively, j firms among the other F − 1 firms simultaneously make
an offer to worker w with probability CjF−1q
j(1− q)F−1−j. Therefore, firm f is matched with
worker w only with probability 1
j+1
because worker w’s preferences are uniformly distributed.
The sum over all possible j from 0 to F − 1 gives us the overall probability of firm f ’s offer
being accepted. We can simplify this expression as follows:
∑F−1
j=0
CjF−1q
j (1− q)F−1−j 1
j+1
(B.2.3)
=
∑F−1
j=0
(F−1)!
j!(F−1−j)!q
j (1− q)F−1−j 1
j+1
(B.2.4)
=
∑F−1
j=0
1
Fq
F !
(j+1)!(F−(1+j))!q
j+1 (1− q)F−(1+j) (B.2.5)
= 1
Fq
∑F
j=1
F !
j!(F−j)!q
j (1− q)F−j (B.2.6)
= 1
Fq
(∑F
j=0
F !
j!(F−j)!q
j (1− q)F−j − (1− q)F
)
(B.2.7)
= 1
Fq
(
1− (1− q)F
)
= W
F
(
1− (1− 1
W
)F)
. (B.2.8)
Alternatively, if firm f makes an offer to its top signaling worker, its offer is accepted
with probability one. Therefore, it is optimal for the firm to make an offer to the signaling
worker only if u(W ) > W
F
(
1− (1− 1
W
)F)
u(1). We conclude that under assumption B.2.1
there is no other non-babbling symmetric equilibrium in the offer game with signals. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We first calculate an explicit formula for the increase in the
expected number of matches from the introduction of the signaling mechanism.
Lemma B1. Consider a market with W workers and F > 2 firms. The expected number of
matches in the offer game with no signals equals
mNS(F,W ) = W
(
1− (1− 1
W
)F)
. (B.2.9)
The expected number of matches in the offer game with signals equals
mS(F,W ) = F
 1− (F−1F )W + W (F−1)2W−2FW (F−2)W−1 (1− F−1W (1− (F−2F−1)W )) ∗
∗
(
1− (1− 1
W
(F−2
F−1)
W−1)F−1)
 . (B.2.10)
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Proof of Lemma B1. Let us first calculate the expected number of matches in the pure
coordination game with no signals. Proposition A1 establishes that the unique symmetric
non-babbling equilibrium when agents use anonymous strategies is as follows. Each firm
makes an offer to its top worker and each worker accepts the best offer among those available.
We have already calculated the probability of firm f being matched to its top worker in
Proposition B1. The probability of this event is
W
F
(
1− (1− 1
W
)F)
.Therefore, the expected total number of matches in the game with no signals equals
mNS(F,W ) = W
(
1− (1− 1
W
)F)
(B.2.11)
Let us now calculate the expected number of matches in the offer game with signals.
Proposition B1 derives agent strategies in the unique symmetric non-babbling equilibrium
in the pure coordination game with signals. Each worker sends her signal to her top firm
and each firm makes its offer to its top signaling worker if it receives at least one signal,
otherwise it makes an offer to its top ranked worker.
We first calculate ex-ante probability of being matched by some firm f. We denote the
set of workers that send her signal to firm f as WSf ⊂ W . If firm f receives at least one
signal, |WSf | > 0, it is guaranteed a match because each worker sends her signal to her top
firm. If firm f receives no signals, it makes an offer to its top ranked worker Tf . This worker
accepts firm f ’s offer only if this offer is the best one among those she receives. Let us denote
the probability that Tf accepts firm f
′s offer (under the condition that firm f receives no
signals) as
PTf ,|WSf |=0 ≡ P (Tf accepts firm f
′s offer| ∣∣WSf ∣∣ = 0).
The ex-ante probability that firm f is matched then equals
Prob matchf (F,W ) = P (|WSf | > 0) ∗ 1 + P (|WSf | = 0) ∗ PTf ,|WSf |=0. (B.2.12)
If firm f receives no signals, |WSf | = 0, it makes an offer to Tf , which we will call worker
w. Worker w receives an offer from its top ranked firm, say firm f0, conditional on firm f
receiving no signals, |WSf | = 0, with probability equal to
G = P (|WSf0| = 1||WSf | = 0) ∗ 1 + ...+ P (|WSf0| = W ||WSf | = 0) ∗ 1W (B.2.13)
=
∑W−1
j=0
CjW−1
(
1
F−1
)j
(1− 1
F−1)
W−j−1 1
j+1
. (B.2.14)
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Intuitively, firm f0 receives a signal from a particular worker with probability
1
F−1 (note that
firm f receives no signals). Then, if firm f0 receives signals from j other workers, worker
w receives an offer from firm f0 with probability
1
j+1
. Similarly to equation (B.2.3) the
expression for G simplifies to
G = F−1
W
(
1− (1− 1
F−1)
W
)
. (B.2.15)
Firm f can be matched with worker w only if worker w does not receive an offer from its
top firm, which happens with probability 1−G. If worker w does not receive an offer from
her top firm − firm f0 − firm f competes with other firms that have received no signals
from workers. The probability that some firm f ′ among firms F\{f, f0} receives no signals
conditional on the fact that worker w sends her signal to firm f0 and firm f receives no
signals (|WSf | = 0) equals r = (1− 1F−1)W−1. Note that the probability that firm f ′ does not
receive a signal from a worker equals 1− 1
F−1 , because firm f receives no signals. There are
also only W − 1 workers that can send a signal to firm f ′, because worker w sends her signal
to firm f0.
Therefore, the probability that some firm f ′ among firms F\{f, f0} receives no signals
and makes an offer to worker w, conditional on the fact that worker w sends her signal to
firm f0, equals
r
W
. Therefore, the probability that worker w prefers the offer of firm f to
other offers (conditional on the fact that firm f receives no signals and worker w sends her
signal to firm f0) equals
34
∑F−2
j=0
CjF−2
(
r
W
)j
(1− r
W
)F−2−j 1
j+1
= W
(F−1)r
(
1− (1− r
W
)F−1)
. (B.2.16)
The probability that worker w accepts firm f ′s offer then equals
PTf ,|WSf |=0 = (1−G)
(
W
(F−1)r
(
1− (1− r
W
)F−1))
.
Taking into account that firm f receives no signals with probability P (|WSf | = 0) = (1− 1F )W ,
the probability of firm f being matched in the offer game with signals is then
Prob matchf (F,W ) = 1− (1− 1F )W + (1− 1F )W ∗ PTf ,|WSf |=0
= 1− (1− 1
F
)W + (1− 1
F
)W W
(F−1)r ∗ (B.2.17)(
1− F−1
W
(
1− (1− 1
F−1)
W
)) ∗ (1− (1− r
W
)F−1)
34Note that the maximum number of offers worker w could get equals to M − 1 as it does not receive an
offer from its top firm f0.
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where r = (1 − 1
F−1)
W−1. The expected total number of matches in the offer game with
signals equals mS(F,W ) = F ∗ Prob matchf (F,W ). 
Lemma B1 establishes the expected total number of matches in the offer game with and
without signals. Let us first fix W and calculate where the increase in the expected number
of matches from the introduction of the signaling mechanism, V (F,W ) = mS(F,W ) −
mNS(F,W ), attains its maximum. In order to obtain the proposition, we consider large
markets (markets where the number of firms and the number of workers are large) and we
use Taylor’s expansion formula:
(1− a)b = exp(−ab+O(a2b)). (B.2.18)
where O(a2b) is a function that is smaller than a constant for large values of a2b. Setting x ≡
F
W
, the expected number of matches in the offer game with no signals can be approximated
as
mNS(F,W ) = W
(
1− (1− 1
W
)F)
= W (1− e−x+O(x/W )).
Let us now consider the expected number of matches in the offer game with signals.
Using the result of Lemma B1 we get
mS(F,W ) = Wx
(
1− e−1/x+O(1/(x2W )) + A ∗B
)
where
A =
(
1− F−1
W
(
1− (F−2
F−1)
W
))
and
B = W (F−1)
2W−2
FW (F−2)W−1
(
1− (1− 1
w
(F−2
F−1)
W−1)F−1) .
We first calculate an approximation of A for large markets. Using (B.2.18) we have that
1− (1− 1
F−1)
W = 1− e−x+O(1/(x2W ))
and
A = 1− x
(
1− e−1/x+O(1/(x2W ))
)
+O(1/ (xW )).
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We now calculate an approximation of B for large markets:
W (F−1)2W−2
FW (F−2)W−1 =
W
F
(
F−1
F
)W−1 (F−1
F−2
)W−1
= 1
x
e−(W−1)/F+O(1/(x
2W ))e(W−1)/(F−1)+O(1/(x
2W ))
= 1
x
eO(1/(x
2W )).
Also, we have that (
1− (1− Z
W
)F−1)
= 1− e−Z(F−1)/W+O(x/W )
= 1− e−Zx+O(x/W )
where Z = (F−2
F−1)
W−1 = e−1/x+O(1/(x
2W )). Finally, we have
B = W (F−1)
2W−2
FW (F−2)W−1 ∗
(
1− (1− 1
W
(F−2
F−1)
W−1)F−1)
= 1
x
eO(1/(x
2W ))(1− e−xe−1/x+O(x/W )).
Putting it all together, we have
V (F,W ) = Wx
(
1− e−1/x+O(1/W ) + (1− x (1− e−1/x+O(1/W ))+O(1/W )) ∗
∗ 1
x
eO(1/W )(1− e−xe−1/x+O(1/W ))
)
−
−W (1− e−x+O(1/W ))
= W
(
x− xe−1/x + (1− x (1− e−1/x)) (1− e−xe−1/x)− 1 + e−x)+O(1)
= Wα(x) +O(1)
where α(x) is a positive quasi-concave function that attains maximum at x0 ' 1.012113.
Therefore, for fixed W , V (F,W ) attains its maximum value at F = x0W +O(1).
Similar to the previous derivation, we can fix F and calculate the value of W where
V (F,W ) attains its maximum:
V (F,W ) = F
(
1− e−1/x+O(1/W ) + (1− x (1− e−1/x+O(1/W ))+O(1/W ))
∗ 1
x
eO(1/W )(1− e−xe−1/x+O(1/W ))
)
−F
x
(1− e−x+O(1/F ))
= F
(
1− e−1/x + (1− x (1− e−1/x)) 1
x
(1− e−xe−1/x)− 1
x
(
1− e−x))+O(1)
= Fβ(x) +O(1)
where β(x) is a positive quasi-concave function that attains maximum at x00 ' 0.53074.
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Therefore, for fixed F , V (F,W ) attains its maximum value at W = y0F + O(1), where
y0 = 1/x00 = 1.8842. 
B.3 Extension: Signaling with Many Positions and Many Signals
In this section we consider a model of matching markets in a symmetric environment that is
similar to the one in Sections 3 and 4. The difference is that each firm now has the capacity
to hire up to L workers, and each worker may send up to K identical costless private signals.
We assume that the number of signals each worker may send is less than the number of
firms, K < F, and each worker can send at most one signal to a particular firm.
We assume that firm utilities are additive, i.e. firm f with preferences θf over individual
workers values a match with a subset of workers W0 ⊂ W as u(θf ,W0) =
∑
w∈W0 u(θf , w),
where u(θf , ·) is a von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function. Worker w with preference
list θw values a match with firm f as v(θw, f). We keep all assumptions of Sections 3 and 4
regarding agent utilities u(·, ·) and v(·, ·).
The timing and strategies of agents of the offer game without signals can be adopted
from Section 3:
1. Agents’ preferences are realized. In the case of a signaling mechanism, each worker
sends up to K private, identical, costless signals to firms. Signals are sent simultane-
ously, and are observed only by firms who have received them.
2. Each firm makes an offer to at most L workers; offers are made simultaneously.
3. Each worker accepts at most one offer from the set of offers she receives.
Once again, sequential rationality ensures that workers will always select the best available
offer. Hence, we take this behavior for workers as given and focus on the reduced game
consisting of the first two stages.
A mixed strategy for worker w when deciding wether and to whom to send signals is a
map from the set of all possible preference lists to the set of distributions over subsets of
firms of size K or less that we denote as ∆(2FK), i.e. σw : Θw → ∆(2FK). Similarly, a mixed
strategy of firm f is a map from the set of all possible preference lists, Θf , and the set of
all possible combinations of received signals, 2W , to the set of distributions over subsets of
workers of size L or less, which we denote as ∆(2WL). That is, σf : Θf × 2W → ∆(2WL).
Preferences of both firms and workers are independently and uniformly chosen from all
possible preference orderings. Similarly to Sections 3 and 4 we define σW , σF , Σw,Σf , piw, and
pif . The definition of sequential equilibrium and anonymous strategies can also be adopted
in an analagous manner.
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We first consider an offer game without signals. If firms use anonymous strategies, the
chances of hiring any worker, conditional on making her an offer, are the same. Therefore,
each firm optimally makes its offers to the L highest-ranked workers on its preference list.
This is the unique symmetric equilibrium of the offer game without signals when firms use
anonymous strategies (see Proposition B3).
We now turn to the analysis of the offer game with signals. In any symmetric equilibrium
in which workers send signals and signals are interpreted as a sign of interest by firms and
hence increase the chance of receiving an offer, each worker sends her K signals to her K
most preferred firms (see Proposition B4). As in the case of one signal and each firm only
having one position, we pin down the behavior of workers in equilibrium: workers send their
signals to their highest ranked firms, and workers accept the best available offer. We now
examine offers of firms in the second stage of the game, taking the strategies of workers and
beliefs of firms about interpreting signals as given.35
In Section 4 each worker could send up to one signal, and each firm had L = 1 positions
to fill. Then, when all other firms used anonymous strategies, firm f decided between making
an offer to f ’s most preferred worker Tf (or T
1
f ) and f ’s most preferred worker in the subset of
signaled workers Sf (or S
1
f ). Now, when all other firms use anonymous strategies, firm f can
make up to L offers. When deciding whom to make the first offer, firm f , once more, decides
between the most preferred worker Tf (or T
1
f ) and the most prefered worker among those
who sent a signal Sf (or S
1
f ) where that decision may depend on the total number of signals
received. So, if firm f received |WS| signals and uses a cutoff strategy with corresponding
cutoff j|WS |, then f makes an offer to S1f if and only if the rank of S
1
f is lower or equal than
j|WS |. If firm f made an offer to S1f , then, for the second position, the firm decides between
T 1f and S
2
f the most preferred worker among those that sent a signal to whom firm f has not
made an offer yet. Furthermore, firm f will use the same cutoff strategy as before: Firm f
still received |WS| signals and hence will make an offer to S2f compared to T 1f if and only if
the rank of S1f is lower than j|WS |.
If the firm made its first offer to T 1f , then for the second offer, firm f decides between T
2
f
and S1f , where f can use a new cutoff strategy, since the alternative to a signaling worker
is now T 2f , the overall second most preferred worker, and not T
2
f . We can show that in
equilibrium, the cutoff for T 2f will be greater than for T
1
f for any number if received signals
(see Proposition B5). We can now define the notion of cutoff strategies for this setting.
35Note that in any non-babbling symmetric equilibrium, all information sets for firms are realized with
positive probability. Hence, the beliefs of firms are determined by Bayes’ Law: if a firm receives a signal
from a worker, it believes that it is on of the kth top firms, k ∈ {1, ...,K}, in the workers’ preference list and
the probability of having rank k is identical across ranks {1, ...,K}.
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Definition B1 (Cutoff Strategies in Case of Many Positions and Multiple Signals). Strategy
σf is a cutoff strategy for firm f if there are L vectors J
l = (jl1, ..., j
l
W ), l = 1, ..., L such that
for any θf ∈ Θf and any setWS of workers who sent a signal to firm f we have the following:
For any number m of offers already made, let the most preferred worker to whom firm f
has not yet made an offer be T rf of rank 1 ≤ r < L and let the most preferred worker who
sent a signal and to whom f has not yet made an offer be Sqf of rank 1 ≤ q < L, where
m = q + r − 2. Then firm f makes its next offer to{
Sqf if rankθf (S
q
f ) ≤ jr|WS |
T rf otherwise.
We call (J1, . . . , JL) a cutoff matrix that has cutoff vectors for each of the top L ranked
workers as its components. Note that the probability of a firm’s offer being accepted by
any worker who has signaled to it is the same as in a symmetric equilibrium. Similarly, the
probability of a firm’s offer being accepted by any worker who has not signaled to the firm
is also the same across such workers (see Lemma B2).
Using an argument similar to the case of one position and one signal, we show that
cutoff strategies are optimal strategies for firms (see Proposition B6). We can also impose
a partial order on the cutoff strategies as in Section 4. However, strategies of firms are no
longer necessarily strategic complements. When other firms respond more to signals, this
decreases the payoff from making an offer to both workers who have and workers who have
not signaled to the firm. This is because receiving a signal does not guarantee acceptance in
case an offer is tendered to that worker. We can, however, assure the existence of symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium.
Theorem B1 (Equilibrium Existence). There exists a symmetric equilibrium of the offer
game with signals where 1) workers send their signals to top K firms, and 2) firms play
symmetric cutoff strategies.
We now address the welfare implications from the introduction of a signaling mechanism.
Proposition B2 and Theorem B2 formally restate our welfare results from previous chapters
for the case when firms have many positions and workers can send multiple signals. The
logic of their proofs again begins with an incremental approach: we first study the effect of
a single firm increasing its cutoff, that is, responding more to signals. We then rank various
signaling equilibria in terms of their outcomes. Finally, we show how the introduction of a
signaling mechanism impacts our three measures of welfare.
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Proposition B2 (Welfare Across Equilibria). Consider any two symmetric cutoff strategy
equilibria where in one equilibrium firms have greater cutoffs. Compared to the equilibrium
with lower cutoffs, in the equilibrium with greater cutoffs we have the following:
• the expected number of matches is weakly greater,
• workers have weakly higher expected payoffs, and
• firms have weakly lower expected payoffs.
Theorem B2 (Welfare Impact of a Signaling Mechanism). Consider any non-babbling sym-
metric equilibrium of the offer game with signals. Then the following three statements hold.
i. The expected number of matches is strictly greater than in the unique equilibrium of
the offer game with no signals.
ii. The expected welfare of workers is strictly greater than in the unique equilibrium of the
offer game with no signals.
iii. The welfare of firms may be greater or smaller than in the unique equilibrium of the
offer game with no signals.
Proofs: Signaling with Many Positions and Many Signals
In addition to providing proofs for the above results, this section introduces Propositions
B3-B6 and Lemma B2 which help establish the main findings.
Proposition B3. The unique equilibrium of the offer game with no signals when firms use
anonymous strategies and workers accept the best available offer is σf (θf ) = (θ
1
f , ..., θ
L
f ) for
all f ∈ F and θf ∈ Θf .
Proof. The proof repeats the argument of Proposition 1. 
Proposition B4. In any symmetric non-babbling equilibrium of the offer game with signals
each worker sends signals to her K top firms.
Proof. Select an arbitrary worker. Firms use symmetric anonymous strategies, signals are
identical, and the worker can send at most one signal to a given firm. Hence, from the
worker’s perspective the probability of getting an offer from a firm depends only on whether
the worker has sent a signal to this firm or not. Similar to the argument of the proof of
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Proposition 4 the probability of getting an offer from a firm that receives the worker’s signal is
greater than the probability of getting an offer from a firm that does not receive the worker’s
signal. Since this probability does not depend on the identity of the firm in a symmetric
equilibrium we conclude that the worker optimally sends her signals to her K top firms. 
Proposition B5. Suppose firms −f use anonymous strategies and workers send their signals
to their top K firms. Then firm f makes offers to its LNS ∈ {0, ..., L} top workers who have
signaled to it and to its LS = L − LNS top workers who have not signaled to it in any
non-babbling symmetric sequential equilibrium.
Proof. Note that firms use anonymous strategies, workers send their signal to their top K
firms, and workers accept the best available offer. We first prove a lemma that states that
from point of view of firm f , the probability that workers who have and have not signaled
to it accept its offer depends only on the number of signals firm f receives.
Lemma B2. Suppose firms −f use anonymous strategies and workers send their signals to
their top K firms. Consider two events, A and B. Event A is that firm f receives the set
of signals WS. Event B is that firm f receives the set of signals WˇS , where |WS| = |WˇS|.
Then
• the probability that worker w ∈ WS accepts firm f ’s offer conditional on event A equals
the probability that worker w′ ∈ WˇS accepts firm f offer conditional on event B;
• the probability that worker w ∈ W\WS accepts firm f ’s offer conditional on event A
equals the probability that worker w′ ∈ W\WˇS accepts firm f offer conditional on event
B.
Proof. Let us consider firm f with realized preference profile θ∗f ∈ Θf that receives
signals from the set of workers WS. We first prove that the probability that a worker from
WS accepts firm f ’s offer conditional on event A equals the probability that a worker from
WˇS accepts firm f ’s offer conditional on event B.
Note that firm f believes that it is one of the top K firms in worker preference list if it
receives an offer from her. Let us denote the set of possible agent profiles consistent with
firm f beliefs in both events as
ΘA ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|θf = θ∗f and rankθws (f) ∈ {1, ..., K} for each ws ∈ WS}
ΘB ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|θf = θ∗f and rankθws (f) ∈ {1, ..., K} for each ws ∈ WˇS}
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Since firm f receives the same number of signals for both events, i.e. |WS| = |WˇS|,
for each worker wa ∈ WS we pair some worker w′a ∈ WˇS, a = 1, ..., |WS|. Let us denote
rankθwa (f) = ka and rankθw′a
(f) = k′a. Therefore, ka, k
′
a ∈ {1, ..., K} for each a. We denote
a permutation that changes ka and k
′
a’s positions in a worker’s preference list as
ρwa : (..., ka, ..., k
′
a, ...)→ (..., k′a, ..., ka, ...).
We also denote a permutation that changes the ranks of wa and w
′
a for every a in a firm
preference lists as
ρf : (..., wa, ..., w
′
a, ...)→ (..., w′a, ..., wa, ...).
Beginning with arbitrary profile of preferences θ ∈ ΘA, we construct a profile of prefer-
ences θ′ as follows:
• we do not change firm f preference list, i.e. θ′f = θ∗f ,
• the ranks of workers wa and w′a are exchanged in the preference lists of firms −f for
each a: for each firm f ′ ∈ −f, θ′f = ρf (θf ),
• firms in positions ka and k′a in worker wa and worker w′a preference profiles are ex-
changed for each a:
θ′wa = ρ
wa(θwa), θ
′
w′a = ρ
wa(θw′a), and
• for any other w0 ∈ W\(WS⋃ WˇS), θw0 = θ′w0 .
Since firm f ’s preference list is unchanged, θ′f = θ
∗, and firm f receives signals from the
set WˇS for profile θ′, this profile belongs to ΘB. Since firm −f strategies are anonymous for
any f ′ ∈ −f and for any WS
f ′ ⊂ W , we have that
σf ′(ρ
f (θf ′), ρ
f (WSf ′)) = ρ
f
(
σf ′(θf ′ ,WSf ′)
)
.
Workers in WS and WˇS send their signals to the same firms among −f for both profiles θ
and θ′. Therefore, i.e. ρf (WS
f ′) =W
S
f ′ . Since θ
′
f = ρ
f (θf ) we have that
σf ′(θ
′
f ′ ,WSf ′) = ρ
(
σf ′(θf ′ ,WSf ′)
)
This means that the probability of firm f ′ making an offer to worker wa ∈ WS for profile θ
equals the probability of making an offer to a worker in w′a ∈ WˇS for profile θ′. Moreover,
since we exchange worker wa and w
′
a preference lists for profile θ
′, whenever it is optimal for
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worker wa to accept firm f offer for profile θ, it is optimal for worker w
′
a to accept firm f
′s
offer for profile θ′.
Since firm types are independent the probability of firm f being matched when it makes
an offer to wa for profile θ equals the probability of firm f being matched when it makes
an offer to worker w′a for profile θ
′. Therefore, for each θ ∈ ΘA there exists θ′ ∈ ΘB such
that the probability that firm f gets an offer from worker wa equals the probability that
firm f gets an offer from worker w′a. Moreover, profile θ
′ is different for different θ by the
construction. Therefore, we have constructed a bijection between sets ΘA and ΘB. Since θ
and θ′ are equally probable, the likelihood that firm f ’s offer is accepted by worker wa in
the event A equals the probability that firm f ’s offer is accepted by worker w′a in the event
B.
An analagous construction works for the proof of the second statement that involves
workers in sets W\WS and W\WˇS. Therefore, the probability that worker w ∈ W\WS
accepts firm f offer conditional on event A equals the probability that worker w′ ∈ W\WˇS
accepts firm f offer conditional on event B. 
The statement of the proposition follows directly from the lemma. Since the probability
that the worker who has sent a signal to firm f accepts its offer is independent of the identity
of the worker, firm f prefers to make offers to its top workers among those who signaled
to it. Similarly, firm f prefers to make offers to its top workers among those who has not
signaled to it. Finally, firm f prefers to make all L offers. 
Proposition B6. Suppose workers send their signals to their top K firms. Then for any
strategy σf of firm f , there exists a cutoff strategy that provides f with a weakly higher
expected payoff than σf for any anonymous strategies σ−f of opponent firms −f .
Proof. Let us consider two sets of workers that firm f might receive WS and WˇS such that
WS=WˇS. Firm f makes an offer to workers Woffer =WSoffer
⋃WNSoffer such thatWNSoffer ⊂
WS and WNSoffer ⊂ W\WS in equilibrium. Lemma B2 proves that identities of workers who
have sent a signal to firm f do not influence the probability that workers accept the firm’s
offer provided that the total number of signals firm f receives is constant. Therefore, if
workers WSoffer are amongWˇS, i.e. WSoffer ⊂ WˇS, it is still optimal for firm f to make its
offers to workers Woffer.
Let us again consider two sets of signals with the same power, i.e. WS and WˇS such
that WS=WˇS. However, these sets differ now in one worker: there exist w ∈ WS and
w′ ∈ WˇS such that WS\w=WˇS\w′. Moreover, firm f prefers worker w′ to worker w, i.e.
rankθf (w
′) > rankθf (w). As a consequence of Lemma B2, if firm f makes an offer to worker
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w when it receives the set of signals WS in equilibrium, it should make an offer to w′ when
it receives the set of signals WˇS . Let us consider the case when sets WS and WˇS differ in
more than one worker. There are some workers in Wˇ0 ⊂ WˇS who are better than workers
in W0 ⊂ WS who receive an offer from firm f when it recieves signals from WS . Similar
argument shows that firm f should then optimally make an offer to Wˇ0 when it receives
signals from WˇS .
The two arguments presented above allows us to conclude that if firm −f use anonymous
strategies, firm f ’s optimal strategy could be represented as some cutoff strategy. 
Proof of Theorem B1.
The proof repeats the steps of the proof of Theorem 3. 
Lemma B3. Assume firms use cutoff strategies and workers send their signals to their top
K firms. Fix the strategies of firms −f as σ−f . Let firm f ’s strategy σf differ from σ′f only
in that σ′f has greater cutoffs (responds more to signals). Then we have
Eθ(m(σ
′
f , σ−f , θ)) ≥ Eθ(m(σf , σ−f , θ))
Eθ(piw(σ
′
f , σ−f , θ)) ≥ Eθ(piw(σf , σ−f , θ))
where m(·) denotes the total number of matches.
Proof. Let us consider firm f cutoff strategies σf and σ
′
f such that σ
′
f has weakly greater
cutoffs for profile θf :
σf (θf ,WSf ) = WSoffer
⋃
WNSoffer
σ′f ′(θf ,WSf ) = WˇSoffer
⋃
WˇNSoffer
In order to preserve anonymity firm f also should have the corresponding increase in cutoff
strategies for any profile of preferences and any set of received signals of the same power.
Firm f responds more to signals for profile θf means that WSoffer ⊂ WˇSoffer ⊂ WSf and
WˇNSoffer⊂WNSoffer ⊂ W\WSf . Proposition B5 shows that |WSoffer
⋃WNSoffer| =|WˇSoffer⋃ WˇNSoffer|=
L. We consider only the case when WSoffer\WˇSoffer = wS and WˇNSoffer\WNSoffer = wNS. More
general case directly follows.
We denoter two sets of preference profiles
Θ+ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ| m(σf , σ−f , θ) < m(σ′f , σ−f , θ)}
Θ− ≡ {θ ∈ Θ| m(σf , σ−f , θ) > m(σ′f , σ−f , θ)}
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For each profile θ from set Θ+ it must be the case that without firm f offer wNS has an
offer from another firm, and worker wS does not
m(σ′f , σ−f , θ)−m(σf , σ−f , θ) = 1. (B.3.1)
Similarly, if profile θ is from set Θ−, it must be the case that without firm f offer wS has an
offer from another firm and wNS does not
m(σ′f , σ−f , θ)−m(σf , σ−f , θ) = −1. (B.3.2)
We will now show that |Θ+| ≥ |Θ−|. Equations (B.3.1) and (B.3.2) along with the fact
that each θ ∈ Θ+ ∪Θ− happens equally likely will then be enough to prove the result.
If profile θ belongs to Θ−, without firm f ’s offer, worker wS has an offer from another
firm, name this firm f ′, and worker wNS does not. We construct function ψ : Θ → Θ as
follows. Let us considerLet ψ(θ) be the profile such that
• firms swap the positions of workers wNS and wS in their preference lists.
• if both wS and wNS send signals to firm f ′ for profile θ their preferences remain
unchanged
• if woker wS (wNS) sends her signal to firm f ′ but worker wNS (wS) does not for profile
θ, find a firm fy such that worker w
S(wNS) does not send her signal to firm fy, and
worker wNS (wS)does. Exchange the positions of firm f ′ and firm fy in worker wNS
and worker wS preference lists.
Note that firm fy exists because each worker sends exactly K signals in any non-babling
symmetric equilibrium. We need the latter modification because each worker can send several
signals, and the fact that worker wSsends her signal to firm f does not guarantee that she
does not send another signal to firm f ′.
If profile θ belongs to Θ−, without firm f ’s offer, worker wS has an offer from firm f ′,
and worker wNS does not. Therefore, when preferences are ψ(θ), without firm f ’s offer the
following two statements should be true i) worker wNS must have another offer and ii)
worker wS cannot have another offer.
To see i), note that under θ, worker wS his outside offer comes from firm f ′. Under ψ(θ)
worker wNS take position of worker wS in firm f ′ preference list, and worker wNS sends a
signal to firm f ′ for profile ψ(θ) whenever worker wS sends a signal to firm f ′ for profile θ.
Anonymity of firm strategies guarantee that firm f ′ makes an offer to worker wNS.
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To see ii), suppose to the contrary that under ψ(θ), worker w does in fact receive an
outside offer from some firm f ′′. This cannot be firm f ′. Otherwise worker wNS should get
an offer from firm f ′ for profile θ by anonymity. This cannot be firm fy because worker wNS
would get an offer from firm fy for profile θ.
The main idea of the construction preserves the logic of Theorem 4. Specifically, if a
worker receives firm’s offer when she does not send a signal to the firm, she will definitely
receives an offer if she sends a signal to the firm.
From i) and ii), we have
θ ∈ Θ− ⇒ ψ(θ) ∈ Θ+.
Since function ψ is injective, we have |Θ+| ≥ |Θ−|.
In order to prove the second statement note that the expected number of matches of each
worker increases when firm f responds more to signals. Using the construction presented
above, one could show whenever worker w looses a match with firm f for profile θ (worker
w ranks firm f low) it is possible to construct profile θ′ when worker w obtains the match
(worker w ranks firm f high). The function that matches these profiles is again injective.
Moreover, worker w values more the match with high ranked firms. Therefore, ex-ante utility
of worker w increases when firm f responds more to signals. 
Proof of Proposition B2.
The result that the expected number of matches and the expected welfare of workers is
higher in the equilibrium with higher cutoffs is an immediate consequence of Lemma B3.
In order to show that firms have lower expected payoffs in the equilibrium with greater
cutoffs we first consider the following situation. We take some firm f such that its strategy
σf differs from σ
′
f only in that σ
′
f has weakly greater cutoffs. Let us consider some firm
f ′ ∈ −f . For each profile of preferences θf ′ and a set of signals WS, firm f ′ either makes an
offer to Sf ′(θf ′ ,WS) or Tf ′(θf ′ ,WS). If firm f responds more to signals this decreases the
probability that both Tf ′ and Sf ′ accept firm f
′ offer. Therefore, the expected payoff of firm
f ′ ∈ −f weakly decreases when firm f responds more to signals.
Eθ(pif ′(σf , σ−f , θ)) ≥ Eθ(pif ′(σ′f , σ−f , θ)).
Let us now consider two symmetric equilibria where firms play cutoff strategies σ˜ and σ¯
correspondingly such that σ˜ ≥ σ¯. From the definition of an equilibrium strategy we have:
Eθ[pif (σ¯f , σ¯−f , θ)] ≥ Eθ[pif (σ˜f , σ¯−f , θ)]
Using the result proved above we proceed with
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Eθ[pif (σ˜f , σ¯−f , θ)] ≥ Eθ[pif (σ˜f , σ˜−f , θ)]
Therefore
Eθ[pif (σ¯f , σ¯−f , θ)] ≥ Eθ[pif (σ˜f , σ˜−f , θ)]

Proof of Theorem B2.
Denote firm strategies in the unique equilibrium of the offer game with no signals as
σ0F . Now consider a symmetric equilibrium of the offer game with signals where agents use
strategies (σF , σW ). If agents employ strategies (σ
0
F , σW ), the expected number of matches
and the welfare of workers equal the corresponding parameters in the offer game with no
signals. Therefore, the result that the expected number of matches and the expected welfare
of workers in a symmetric equilibrium in the offer game with signals are weakly greater than
the corresponding parameters in the unique equilibrium of the offer game with no signals is a
consequence of sequential application of Lemma B3. The result for worker and firm welfare,
and the argument that the comparison is strict are analagous to those in Theorem 4. 
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